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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“The essence of truth is un-truth” 
 
(Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event, Section 228) 
 
 
 
“The problem of the value of truth came before us - or was it we who came before 
the problem? Who of us is Oedipus here? Who the Sphinx? It is a rendezvous, it 
seems, of questions and question marks. 
And though it scarcely seems credible, it finally almost seems to us as if the 
problem had never even been put so far - as if we were the first to see it, to fix it 
with our eyes, and risk it. For it does involve a risk, and perhaps there is none 
that is greater.” 
(Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, #2) 
 
 
 
 
 
How is it that we come to find something questionable? Do we come to pose our 
own questions or would it be better to say that the questions choose us, that we are the 
victims of our questions just as much as we fall victim to a flash flood in the desert? 
What if our questions grab us with historical intensity, keeping us wide-awake at night 
and demanding more from us than we can give? Must we risk ourselves, making our 
health the sacrifice, as perhaps Nietzsche did, for the sake of a question? 
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Martin Heidegger and Friedrich Nietzsche were two thinkers driven to the heights 
of philosophy by the questions that held them and refused to let go. There is possibly no 
question more central to both philosophers than the question of truth. For Heidegger, 
truth remains a constant theme throughout his numerous philosophical transformations. 
From Being and Time to his later lecture courses, Heidegger’s meditations on a critique 
of the Western metaphysical tradition are consistently guided by a questioning into the 
essence of truth. In the late 1930s, Heidegger focuses this critique of metaphysics on the 
philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. In his four volume set of lectures entitled Nietzsche, 
Heidegger outlines Nietzsche’s position within the Western metaphysical tradition in part 
through an interpretation of how Nietzsche understands truth. For Heidegger, Nietzsche’s 
understanding of truth does not essentially deviate from the understanding of truth that 
has prevailed over Western philosophical thought since Plato: truth as correctness. This is 
to say that something is true because it holds a relation of accordance to either its idea or 
to an objective state of affairs external to it. Primarily from his reading of the ancient 
Greeks, Heidegger proposes another essence of truth where truth would occur as 
unconcealment, as the stepping out from hiddenness into appearing. This essence of truth 
brings an element of hiddenness, or concealment, into the essence of truth that is later 
forgotten by the metaphysical tradition after Plato. 
Does Nietzsche’s inquiry into the question of truth take him beyond the sense of 
truth as correctness found in Platonism toward a more Greek understanding of truth that 
brings concealment into an unsettling prominence within truth? I explore in this thesis a 
possible double reading of Nietzsche underdeveloped within Heidegger’s first Nietzsche 
3 
 
lecture course from 1936-37. The first reading focuses on Nietzsche as an inversion and 
overturning of Platonism. The second reading focuses on Nietzsche as a thinker who 
resonates with pre-Platonic thought through his development of semblance and 
concealment as essential to life. In this second reading I explore a consistent ambiguity 
within Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche that allows for the more overt reading of 
Nietzsche as an inverter of Platonism to be contested at least partially. 
By presenting a double reading of Heidegger’s first lecture course on Nietzsche, I 
ask whether Nietzsche’s thinking concerning truth can be contained within the 
metaphysical tradition determined as Platonism, a tradition defined by a conception of 
truth as correspondence wherein error or non-accordance is considered as the merely 
inessential opposite to truth. The guiding context of this paper is Heidegger’s reading of 
Nietzsche in light of his understanding of untruth, or concealment, as what is “most 
proper to the essence of truth.”1 As Heidegger thinks truth as aletheia, the disclosure of 
beings from out of concealment, the apparent deformations of truth such as dissemblance, 
dissimulation, falsity, and error pertain to the very essence of truth itself. These 
deformations are part of the unfolding of the essence of truth, and do not fall outside of 
truth as its opposite or simple other. Within this understanding, I ask to what extent 
Nietzsche’s thinking concerning semblance, error, and concealment can bring his work 
into dialogue with this more originary essencing of truth that pays heed to the 
inseparability of truth from untruth developed by Heidegger. 
The first part of this paper traces Heidegger’s 1930 essay, “On the Essence of 
Truth”, in order to situate my reading of the Nietzsche lecture course. My reading of the 
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1930 essay focuses on how when truth is conceived as correspondence, falsity or non- 
correspondence has a simple relation of exteriority to the essence of truth. This essay has 
the trajectory of a regression that proceeds to inquire into the ground, or origin, of this 
conception of truth as correspondence. By continuing this regression to the origin of 
truth, Heidegger discerns freedom as a letting-be of beings which in turn requires that 
there be an engagement with an open region and its openness. According to Heidegger, 
the Greeks experienced this open region as aletheia. At the same time, Heidegger 
introduces a more fundamental and essential untruth, as withdrawal or concealment, that 
is incapable of being conceived while truth is understood as correspondence. Untruth 
thought as concealment is no longer the opposite of truth but is the untruth “most proper 
to the essence of truth.”2 The sense of this essential concealment ranges from the mystery 
arising from the withdrawal of the open region itself, to the persistence of this withdrawal 
 
into errancy, as this withdrawal settles into the way humans comportment themselves to 
beings while forgetting the clearing that gives, or unconceals, these beings to them. The 
reconsidering of the essence of truth means for Heidegger a closer and intimate bond of 
truth to these forms of concealment. 
In the second part of my paper, I focus on the second half of Heidegger’s first 
lecture course on Nietzsche from 1936-37. In the first place, I trace how Heidegger’s 
reading is a continuation of his “On the Essence of Truth” essay insofar as he reads 
Nietzsche as the most extreme point of deformation of the essence of truth toward 
becoming a simple correspondence between intellect and thing. This is, again, to situate 
Nietzsche’s understanding of truth within a conception of truth ubiquitous to western 
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metaphysics as Platonism. In response to this more straight-forward “canonical” reading, 
I develop an alternative reading that finds a second, less Platonic, sense to both 
Heidegger’s choice of Nietzsche quotes, and to the conclusions Heidegger draws from 
them. To support the acuity of giving a double reading of Heidegger’s Nietzsche lecture 
course, I refer to section 234 of Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy where 
Heidegger more expressly understands his reading of Nietzsche to be something open and 
not fully settled. “The way the confrontation with Nietzsche does master and does not 
master his conception of ‘truth’ must become a cornerstone for the decision as to whether 
we are helping his genuine philosophy to its future...”3 
At a key point in section 24 of the lecture course, Heidegger cites Nietzsche’s 
 
“How the True World Became a Fable”, drawing to a head the extent to which Nietzsche 
comes in “twisting free” (Herausdrehung) of the Platonic dichotomy of the true and the 
merely apparent. As a number of philosophers have done in the wake of Nietzsche and 
Heidegger,4 I will read the sixth statement of “How the True Word Became a Fable” as a 
moment in Nietzsche’s thought where he eludes oppositional (two-world) thinking 
altogether, and leaps beyond metaphysical discourse toward a conception of truth that 
exists inseparably from appearance understood, more richly, as “semblance”. In 
conjunction with section 25 of the lecture course, where Heidegger invokes Nietzsche’s 
“ambiguous” use of the word semblance (Schein), I find this ambiguous consideration of 
semblance as a divergence from Platonically informed thought. This move away from 
Heidegger’s reading leads toward an understanding of semblance as intrinsic to how 
Nietzsche will come to understand truth. This brings Nietzsche’s understanding of truth 
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into proximity with Heidegger’s reading of doxa in pre-Platonic thought, as well as de- 
emphasizes the connection of Nietzsche with Platonism. 
Next I will bring in Heidegger’s 1935 lecture course Introduction to Metaphysics 
to show how the theme of semblance is developed in connection to a sense of being as 
phusis. As phusis is an emergent presencing, it shines. This shining inherent to being for 
the Greeks contains a manifold of meanings. As a shining, “being essentially unfolds as 
appearing”5, yet appearing can also mean seeming, so much so that Heidegger writes that 
“seeming means exactly the same as Being here.”6 Being cannot be ventured without 
 
always paying heed to its possibilities of “not” being what it is. This is, for the Greeks, a 
struggle wherein Being must be torn away from seeming and “preserved” against it. I 
show that Nietzsche’s ambiguous handling of semblance can be alternatively understood 
as a return to this originary struggle between the inextricability of being and seeming. 
To give further support to reading Nietzsche in terms of a resonance with pre- 
Platonic, Greek thought, I develop readings of two of his earliest works, The Birth of 
Tragedy and the second of The Untimely Meditations. I read them as attempts to regain a 
thematic of conflict and concealment as essential for the occurrence of truth as a region 
of openness that withdraws as it gives. By his development of the conceptual personae of 
“Dionysus”, Nietzsche recognizes the central role of an ontological oblivion that 
pervaded the height of ancient Greek thought and poetry. From his second essay in The 
Untimely Meditations titled “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life”, 
Nietzsche poses a concept of the “unhistorical" that enables the possibility of history, or 
the living present. Nietzsche’s sense of the unhistorical will be understood as a pervasive, 
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non-psychological forgetting that, through concealing, creates a suitable horizon for the 
emergence of present things and events. These readings of the Dionysian and the 
unhistorical in Nietzsche further reinforce my claim that Nietzsche is more fruitfully read 
in conjunction with pre-Platonic, instead of Platonic, thought. In my readings of the 
Dionysian and, especially, the unhistorical, I also stress a congruence between Nietzsche 
and Heidegger on the role of concealment in truth. 
 
 
 
1 Martin Heidegger, Pathmarks, “On the Essence of Truth”, 148 
2 Martin Heidegger, Pathmarks, 148 
3 Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event, p. 285 
4 As John Sallis writes, “(How the True World Became a Fable) has been widely 
discussed, especially in France, as has Heidegger’s recounting of the story, most notably 
in Jaques Derrida’s text Spurs.”(“Twisting Free: Being to an Extent Sensible,” 2) As 
Sallis notes, there has been a plethora of scholarship on interpreting Nietzsche’s “How 
the True World Became a Fable”, as well as on Heidegger’s interpretation of that fable. 
While I acknowledge the significant work done on this point, it is not the express purpose 
of this thesis to sufficiently document the range and variety of scholarship on this 
question of interpretation. Such an undertaking would require a thesis unto itself. 
5 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 107 
6 ibid. 105 
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CHAPTER II 
 
“ON THE ESSENCE OF TRUTH”: TRUTH AS CORRECTNESS, AND TRUTH 
AS UNCONCEALMENT 
 
 
Heidegger begins his essay “On the Essence of Truth” with the seemingly 
innocent line: “Our topic is the essence of truth.”7 At first read, this statement may seem 
tautological with the essay’s title, as logically, this opening line adds nothing in content. 
Despite appearances, this line contains one more element than does the title: an italicizing 
of essence. In this essay, Heidegger will be speaking not only of truth, but will allude to 
the essay’s more primordial topic of attempting to think the relation of truth to essence; of 
the torsion that will appear within a discourse on truth that will bring it to bear on the 
nature of essence. This will show that an investigation into truth cannot mirror an 
investigation into beings, whether those beings are vegetables, the planets or humans 
themselves. The basic words of Being such as “truth”, “essence” (and “being” itself) 
essentially “deform”8 any discourse that attempts to question their predominant sense. 
The italicizing of essence will come to show that a transformation of an understanding of 
 
truth will be simultaneously a transformation of essence, and hence, the discourse itself 
that attempts to ask these questions must itself undergo such a transformation if it is to 
say anything beyond the commonplace. There can be no straightforward discourse when 
questioning toward the essence of the basic words of philosophy. 
By explicating Heidegger’s “On the Essence of Truth” essay on the way toward 
his Nietzsche lectures, I accomplish two goals. First, before proceeding onward to 
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Heidegger’s complex reading of Nietzsche, it will be important to clarify what Heidegger 
will refer to repeatedly as truth understood as “the true” or accordant, as well as what 
Heidegger may begin to mean when he refers to truth as “aletheia”, or unconcealment. 
The second goal will be to show how a discourse on the essence of truth must necessarily 
be, in the words of John Sallis, a “deformative”9 one. This will allow for a reading of 
Nietzsche as questioning the essence of truth not only by his manifest content, but also by 
 
the style and pathos of his writing; by the way in which his style expresses a struggle in 
the asking of the question so resistant to being questioned, “what do we mean by ‘truth'?” 
“What do we ordinarily understand by the word ‘truth’?”10 writes Heidegger at 
 
the beginning of the first section of “On the Essence of Truth”. This statement, while 
ordinary enough, is delivered ironically as Heidegger is attempting to ask this question 
regarding our ordinary comprehension of truth both from the perspective of common 
sense and as the initial step in a genuine philosophic regression toward essence. From the 
perspective of common sense, truth is hardly a term worth investigating, a term too 
obvious and “well worn” for there to be a need to ask such a question. Nonetheless, 
Heidegger is asking the question of truth, and does so precisely by passing through, 
instead of avoiding, the dissimulations of common sense. In carefully paying heed to the 
weight of common sense, Heidegger proceeds to outline what I have determined to be the 
eight characteristics of truth that persisted unquestioningly throughout the history of 
metaphysics.11 
Truth is first, the actual. In the most obvious way, we ask someone wearing a nice 
watch, “Is that actually a Rolex?” To be actually a Rolex means to really be a Rolex and 
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not a fake or a knockoff. In Heidegger’s example of gold: “actual gold is genuine gold.”12 
Yet this leaves open the question of what is meant here by “genuine”? Can the 
genuineness of gold be denoted by it actually being gold?13 Heidegger doesn’t think so, 
as the use of actual here demands further clarification before giving a decisive answer, 
and moves on to the second characteristic of the ordinary conception of truth: accordance. 
For a thing such as gold to be considered actually what it is, or genuine, this supposes 
that the thing is in some accordance (Übereinstimmung) with what “always and in 
advance, we properly mean by ‘gold’”. Genuineness is based on accordance between the 
thing and some pre-existing definition or form of that said thing. 
The third characteristic of the ordinary conception of truth is that it resides in the 
 
proposition. It is not only the gold itself that is the true or genuine gold. It is equally that 
my statements declaring whether the gold is in fact gold are what can be properly 
determined as true or false. “Being true and truth here signify accord, and that of a double 
sense: on the one hand, the consonance of a matter with what is unposed in advance 
regarding it and, on the other hand, the accordance of what is meant in the statement with 
the matter.”14 Truth means not only that a thing “is” what it is (identity), or stands in 
accordance with itself, but also that the true statement accords, somehow, with the subject 
matter or state of affairs that it is supposed to be faithfully representing. The fourth 
characteristic of the ordinary conception of truth is that this accordance bears a relation to 
knowledge and the intellect. The traditional formula of truth, veritas est adaequatio rei et 
intellectus, implies that the accordance is not merely between a proposition and the thing, 
but of the knowing intellect that produces such propositions and a state of affairs outside 
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of it. It is now more clearly a case of an interior knowledge needing to be determined and 
secured as correctly corresponding to an extra-intellectual object. 
Heidegger continues to unfold this ordinary conception of truth by claiming that 
the very possibility of accordance between intellect and thing implies the “Christian 
theological belief that, with respect to what it is and whether it is, a matter, as created 
(ens creatum), is only insofar as it corresponds to the idea preconceived in the intellectus 
divinus i.e. in the mind of God.”15 Truth as an accordance harbors the theological 
supposition of a world consisting in created things, meaning that each thing that exists 
has a proper form or idea in the mind of God to which it must conform, if it is to be truly 
what it is. The truth of human knowledge is then grounded in the fact that matters and 
propositions “measure up to the idea”16. This segways into the sixth characteristic of the 
ordinary conceptions of truth, namely that truth supposes a worldly reason or what 
 
Heidegger calls a “world-order”. This inherent orderliness of the world is only the 
modern reformation of the theological supposition of a world of created things. Both 
speak equally to a plan and an inherent intelligibility of things to an intellect, the only 
difference being that in worldly reason the laws that determine the essence of things are 
supplied by the human intellect itself and not derived from an (divine) intellect 
transcendent to it. Truth as accordance is essentially a veiled creationism, or what 
amounts to the same, a veiled rationalism, or what we will soon see, a more or less veiled 
Platonism. 
The seventh characteristic, and perhaps the most important (despite the lack of 
space that Heidegger devotes to it in the essay) is that the definition of the essence of 
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truth is independent of the interpretation of the essence of the Being of all beings.17 Truth, 
 
as it is usually conceived does not bear directly or overtly on ultimate matters of 
metaphysics. Instead, truth is something obvious, already decided, and not requiring 
further evaluation in the unfolding of a metaphysical system. Truth, as that “worn and 
almost dulled word”18 taken in the formula veritas est adaequatio intellectus et rei, 
possesses a general and self-evident validity. This would appear to exempt it from being 
worthy of questioning as part of any metaphysical inquiry, whether it be Leibniz, Kant, or 
perhaps even Nietzsche. 
The eighth and final characteristic of the ordinary conception of truth opens a 
central issue for the purposes of this paper. The question is how untruth is to be 
considered. Along with the unquestionable obviousness of the essence of truth itself, 
there follows an “equally obvious” claim that “truth has an opposite, and that there is 
untruth.”19 This untruth is determined as a simple non-accordance of the intellectual 
knowledge or statement with its matter. There are two crucial moments or aspects of this 
 
sense of the false or untrue that will be paramount to understanding the revolution 
Heidegger is about to undertake as he questions truth far beyond what common sense has 
determined for it. The first is that untruth is here, in the ordinary conception of truth, 
considered to exist in an oppositional relationship to truth proper: that untruth’s “non- 
accordance” with the thing, is a simple negation or failure to accord. I say that the fruit is 
a peach and it turns out to be an apricot. The two statements of “it is a peach” and “it is 
an apricot” simply reject or oppose one another, unable to exist in the same universe due 
to the apparently inarguable law of non-contradiction. The second point about untruth 
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here is that, following from what was said above, untruth or ‘falsity’ “falls outside the 
essence of truth.”20 An investigation into ‘the truth’, understood as accordance, does not 
need to consider untruth, as this opposing falsity is the mere negation or failure of 
accordance. Untruth can here be understood solely through its failing to be true, and 
hence having no essence or being of its own.21 It then is clear that with the ordinary 
conception of truth, the “question of comprehending the pure essence of truth, untruth, as 
such an opposite of truth, can be put aside.”22 There is no need to pay any heed to mere 
untruth or falsity as one strives toward truth as the accordance to the pure idea of the 
 
object in question. 
 
Now that what is meant by truth is unquestionably an accordance between an 
intellect and a matter, and that falsity has no place in any such investigation into the 
thematization of truth, how does Heidegger reignite the need to question this essencing of 
truth? And, importantly for the purposes of this paper, how will Heidegger then conceive 
of truth differently, that is, in the relationality of truth and untruth? Heidegger finds his 
opening in asking how accordance is possible, for a proposition and a thing are two very 
dissimilar beings. This accordance between two very dissimilar beings is made possible 
by a previously existing relation between the two. This necessary pre-existing relation is 
what Heidegger will call comportment. If the pen on the table and my statement about it 
are to come into accord, there must first be a relation between myself and the pen that 
opens up the possibility of saying something about that said relation. This accordance, 
now understood as a comporting (Verhalten) or free relation, must take place within an 
open region. This open region would allow for the possibility of two things to stand 
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opposed. This would be an open region “not first created by the presenting but rather is 
only entered into and taken over as a domain of relatedness.”23 In Heidegger’s first 
overturning of the ordinary conception of truth, truth is no longer to be found primarily in 
the proposition. Truth now has a new locus: the open region of comportment. 
Heidegger continues his descent into the ground of the possibility of truth as 
correctness and establishes that the “essence of truth, as the correctness of a statement, is 
freedom.”24 It is important to notice that here Heidegger is not pronouncing a new 
essence of truth, but is concluding his line of thinking that considers the ground of the 
metaphysical essence of truth. While Heidegger has displaced the locus of truth from the 
proposition toward the open region of comportment, the essay is still moving, by section 
three, within the metaphysical conception of truth. The actual transition to another 
essence of truth, which Heidegger will call aletheia, will not begin for a couple more 
pages.25 Importantly, this transition is initiated by Heidegger broaching the phenomenon 
of withdrawal as it first applies to how our engagement with the open region itself 
 
withdraws in concurrence with our engagement with beings. This moment of the open 
region’s withdrawal as it enables the possibility of comportment with beings, is the 
beginning of an essential turn within Heidegger’s discourse on truth. The discussion 
becomes one of both truth as a revealing comportment, and now also untruth taken as the 
withdrawal that enables truth as correctness. As Heidegger writes, “the question 
cornering the essence of truth thus first reaches the originary domain… when, on the 
basis of a prior glimpse of the full essence of truth, it has included a consideration of 
untruth in its unveiling of the essence.”26 The break from truth as accordance or 
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correctness only occurs once untruth is radically reconsidered as the withdrawal of the 
clearing, and what Heidegger will hence explore as concealment. 
As truth is to be reimagined as aletheia, or unconcealment, the guiding change 
that occurs in this transformation of truth is that of the relation between truth and untruth, 
as they no longer oppose and repel each other like oil and water.27 In fact, as Heidegger 
writes at the end of section five titled “the Essence of Truth”, “what brings into accord is 
not nothing, but rather a concealing of beings as a whole.”28 Untruth, now to be taken as 
concealment, complements the opening of a clearing and hence is an indispensable 
 
moment of truth’s essencing both as accordance and as accordance’s ground of 
possibility, letting-be. This indicates that untruth is now intrinsic to the essence of truth 
such that Heidegger can say that “letting-be is intrinsically at the same time a 
concealing.”29 The language of opposition fades and in its place arises a language that 
articulates how untruth is not only intrinsic to the essencing of truth, but “preserves” and 
“conserves” this emerging of truth. This is also to take untruth as no longer something 
simple, no longer the simple “not” of non-accordance. Concealment has within itself 
multiple ways it prevails within the essencing of truth. As was mentioned earlier, the first 
sense of concealment is the withdrawal of the engagement with the clearing itself in the 
occurrence of our comportment to beings within that open region. This sense of 
concealment is further clarified and added upon in section six as Heidegger elaborates a 
sense of concealment as “mystery”. In an answer to the query of what conserves letting- 
be in this relatedness to concealing, Heidegger answers that it is “nothing less than that 
concealing of what is concealed as a whole”30. Concealing is not only the withdrawal of 
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the engagement with the open region, but consists in a second concealing of that very 
withdrawal itself. Concealment takes on the sense of both concealing and self-concealing, 
as it is the “concealing of what is concealed”. This double concealment holds as the 
mystery. Yet, this is not the end. This double concealment bears a tendency toward a 
forgetfulness of this very tendency to concealment. As humans “cling to what is readily 
available”31 or comport themselves to beings, the mystery, the concealment of the 
withdrawal of the open region, itself withdraws or is concealed to the ultimate point of its 
falling into oblivion. By its own inner necessity, the double concealment of the mystery 
intensifies into its own self-disavowal in errancy. In this movement of errancy, as human 
beings engage with the available beings environing them (by our very necessity to act and 
to live as ex-sistent, as still engaging in the open region), truth (as the lighting up of this 
open region) takes its leave and we live in-sistently. In this basic forgetting of the mystery 
in errancy, Dasein in-sists, an in-sistence where the human being is left “to replenish its 
‘world’ on the basis of the latest needs and aims”32. Yet, as we are turned toward the 
readily available beings that environ us, Dasein must at the same time be, in some 
manner, ex-sistent, or still held out into the clearing in some way. To be in-sistently 
turned toward beings is at “one and the same time”33 to be ex-sistently34 turning away 
from the mystery. 
 
The relation of truth and untruth, in the more original questioning of truth, 
becomes a relation thought more originarily as a “turning to and fro proper to Dasein.”35 
Truth is a turning within Dasein from ex-sistence to in-sistence, and vice versa. This 
turning highlights the indissoluble jointure of truth and untruth as mystery and errancy. It 
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is here, in the constant turning to and fro of Dasein from mystery to errancy and (in 
moments) back to the ex-sistence of letting the mystery hold sway, that truth thought now 
as aletheia is further distinguished from metaphysical or Platonic truth. This turning 
within Dasein is not a stable and harmonious congruence of parts. As truth is now thought 
to contain its own non-essence (mystery-errancy), the questioning of this truth is now to 
be carried out through struggle or by an “intrinsically discordant”36 event. To enter into 
the questioning of truth is to enter into the polemos of Heraclitus. As Heidegger writes in 
his 1932 essay “Plato’s Doctrine of Truth”, “truth originally means what has been wrested 
from hiddenness.”37 In like manner, ex-sistence, through its ownmost possibility to fall 
into the forgetfulness of in-sistence, is only experienced through a struggle against the 
prevailing oblivion of Being as humans are continually and essentially drawn to the 
immediate, useful beings of the world. The “unity” of truth and untruth is, I claim, a 
Heraclitean harmony of tensions that demands strength.38 This sense of struggle, or the 
need for a “wresting” of unconcealment from a stubborn hiddenness, hearkens to the 
 
Greek word for truth itself: aletheia. Truth, as the revealing of beings as they are, is not at 
the root of the word. Instead, the fundamental concealment, i.e. lethe, has the foremost 
place in the word. We cannot say that truth comes first, but that truth finds its ground or 
essence in this more originary lethe, or concealment. In this continual and creative 
struggle within the essence of truth, there is a certain priority of untruth within this 
turning. 
A crucial point that Heidegger carefully unfolds in this questioning of truth takes 
him further afield of the common sense and metaphysical understanding of truth. In 
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questioning the essence of truth from the essence of truth, instead of from the doxa39 or 
 
appearance of truth as correctness, the “monstrous"40 question must be broached as to 
 
how untruth might have a peculiar priority within this initial interrelation of truth and 
untruth. The possibility is introduced in section six of the “Essence of Truth” essay when 
Heidegger writes, “the concealment of beings as a whole, un-truth proper, is older than 
every openness of this or that being.”41 The questioning of truth is now beyond the stating 
of a relation between truth and un-truth that contests the metaphysical claim that un-truth, 
as error, does not belong to the essence of truth. Heidegger goes one step further and 
broaches the almost impossible question: Could untruth, as the manifold senses of 
concealment, be the essence of truth? And, in asking this question, how would “essence” 
itself be transformed?42 I believe this question remains underdeveloped within the 1930 
essay itself. In the essay as a whole, the emphasis is more on creating a transition of 
thought from out of truth as accordance toward the essential bringing together of truth 
and untruth as aletheia, leaving this more monstrous and extra-metaphysical possibility as 
a marginal feature of the essay. Heidegger, though, will further develop this possibility of 
the essence of truth later in Contributions to Philosophy: Of The Event.43 
In remark 226 of Contributions to Philosophy called “Aletheia and the clearing of 
concealment,” Heidegger begins by distancing his own meditations on truth from his 
earlier focus on aletheia, or what we might call the positive moment of unconcealment. 
“(Aletheia) indicates that concealment is experienced only as what is to be cleared away, 
what is to be removed.”44 In his earlier questioning of truth through the word aletheia, 
there was an undue emphasis on the moment of revealing or unconcealing. Heidegger’s 
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self-critique of his earlier meditations on unconcealment continues as he writes, “my 
previous attempts at projecting the essence of truth, the endeavor to be understood was 
always primarily directed at an elucidation of the modes of clearing, the variations of 
concealment, and their essential interconnection. (cf., e.g., the lecture on truth, 1930)”. 
Heidegger is here becoming aware that in the tacit priority given to the element of truth 
within the full essence of truth, his approach had remained still too metaphysical. The 
1930 essay is still caught within a paradigm that understood untruth or concealment on 
the basis of, or from, its moment of coming into presence. This does not mean that 
Heidegger, in the 1930 essay, understood the concealment of mystery and errancy in 
terms of presence. It would be clearer to say that what we could call his direction of 
meditation at the time was one of regress that descended toward concealment before 
experiencing from out of that very concealment. The experience of concealment was still 
always to a degree mediated by the initial experience of unconcealment. “Therefore 
questioning, too does not address the concealment itself and its ground.”45 Heidegger 
intensifies his brief excursion into asking if untruth might be “older” than truth, and 
begins to use the language of truth, here in Contributions, as the “clearing for 
concealing.” The emphasis is now on concealing. The clearing or revealing is now for 
concealing. Untruth, or concealment, is not only older than truth, but now is what we 
might call the sheltered essence of truth. Heidegger is now able to say that, “truth as the 
clearing for concealment is thus an essentially different projection than is aletheia.”46 
Aletheia is now seen by Heidegger as still determined “on the basis of phusis”, by the 
emergence of beings in their presencing, and is hence too close to the determination of 
20 
 
truth resulting from a fixation upon this emergence: the Idea of Platonism. Whereas in the 
“On the Essence of Truth” essay, Heidegger never distinguished his own path from that 
of aletheia, there is now a clear distancing in play from that basic word toward something 
stranger that places the emphasis on what does not reveal itself. It is at this point that we 
can say along with Heidegger, and in a quite Nietzschean phrasing, that the “essence of 
truth is untruth”47. 
Before continuing forward in this paper toward a questioning of Heidegger’s 
reading of Nietzsche, there is one more key disruption performed by Heidegger against 
the metaphysical conception of truth that needs to be thematized. “Our topic is the 
essence (Wesen)48 of truth.”49 The first line of “On the Essence of Truth”, by italicizing 
the word essence (although the sentence’s proper subject is truth) hints that this essay is 
equally, although somewhat furtively, a discourse on essence. This aspect of the essay 
comes full circle in section seven, immediately following Heidegger’s discussion of 
errancy. A new possibility of questioning arises when (or if) Dasein is able to be sustained 
in a “resolute openness toward the mystery”50, without succumbing to the ontological 
closure of the movement of errancy (i.e. becoming so ensnared in comporting toward 
beings that the possibility of raising the question of being, or how these beings are given, 
is forgotten and unable to be asked). This possibility of questioning is the revealing of the 
intertwining of the “essence of truth with the truth of essence”. While metaphysical truth 
understood as accordance existed as independent of metaphysical inquiry as such, truth, 
when questioned in a non-metaphysical manner, is simultaneously an interrogation of 
essence. Truth, essence, and Being become in this questioning a differentiated, yet 
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somehow inseparable, trinity. Far from a harmless given, truth has here become not only 
the first question of philosophy, but a question that raises all others in being asked. Truth 
now is thematically recognized by Heidegger as an event that reverberates through every 
questioning and every inquiry that can be made into the Being of beings. Yet, if we 
remember that here truth is to find its essence, its ground, in untruth, where are we with 
essence itself, with Being? Where are we to stand once the basic words that ground us 
have abandoned their complicity with the good sense of reason and become their own 
distortion and dissolution? As this paper continues, the question will continually be raised 
as to how far Nietzsche himself does (or can) travel in this direction of a disruptive, alien, 
and paradoxical truth. I will bracket Heidegger’s own constant evolution with respect to 
this question and restrict myself to use what has been said so far as a framework to better 
understand, not only Nietzsche himself, but to guide my own reading of Heidegger’s 
multifaceted interpretation of Nietzsche in the 1930s. 
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27 There has been much criticism of Heidegger’s understanding of truth as aletheia by 
scholars like Ernst Tugendhat who argue that Heidegger’s account of truth “fails to 
specify the modes of uncovering and givenness characteristic of agreement.” (Beck 2018) 
This amounts to the claim that Heidegger’s aletheia makes the possibility of agreement 
between truth claims and their object difficult, if not impossible to determine. This 
determination then has the further consequence of giving Heidegger’s account of truth a 
lack of “criterion for distinguishing truth and falsity.” (Beck 2018) In being limited to the 
finite, historical horizon of aletheia, we have no recourse to question the truth of this 
horizon and therefore, under Heidegger’s paradigm, we will be incapable of critiquing 
our historical horizon on normative grounds. An interesting response to this difficulty in 
Heidegger’s account of aletheia comes from William Smith who writes, “It is only as 
resolute that Dasein can make the modes of authenticity and inauthenticity normative for 
itself in a critical sense.”(176) Resoluteness, a term featured prominently in Being and 
Time, means the existential transformation of taking over, or realizing, one’s fundamental 
temporal nature or constitutive finitude. Smith suggests that such a seeing into one’s 
temporal horizons can furnish a critical perspective upon the horizon of aletheia, as this 
resolute seeing involves the becoming transparent of this horizon distinct from the usual 
manner in which the horizon is covered over by common sense interpretations of objects 
and events. In resoluteness there can emerge a normative standard that is capable of 
“resolving to work out the inconsistencies in its skills and standards in light of the things 
themselves.”(176) While this is a thought-provoking solution to Tugendhat’s Kantian 
informed critique of Heidegger, Smith is writing under the assumption that the possibility 
of making normative claims needs to be saved. As I understand Heidegger’s notion of 
aletheia, truth as aletheia in no way disrupts the usual, everyday sense we have about 
things-in-themselves and the possibility of our knowledge claims being false according to 
a normative truth. Aletheia does not refute truth as correctness, but grounds correctness, 
along with all of its normative language games, within a historical sending of Being. This 
abyssal ground of historical Being does not interrupt normative claim-making by 
forbidding knowledge of a non-historical thing-in-itself, for the non-historical thing-in- 
itself is in fact historical, and resides “within” the historical horizon once we take this 
horizon to be truly one of Being and not one of a Kantian horizon of epistemological 
subjectivity. It is almost ubiquitous among these criticisms of Heidegger’s notion of 
aletheia that they come from an uncritical reliance on the classical Kantian dualism of a 
horizon of subjective knowledge juxtaposed to a possibly unknowable objective world. 
Such Kantian-informed critiques of aletheia that focus on section 44 of Being and Time 
have apparently failed to take into consideration section 7, on the “Concept of 
Phenomenon”, wherein Heidegger curtly removes his philosophy from the subject-object 
centered questions of epistemological relativity and things-in-themselves. Heidegger 
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CHAPTER III 
 
HEIDEGGER’S CANONICAL READING OF NIETZSCHE 
 
 
 
In Heidegger’s first lecture course from the Nietzsche series of lectures courses, 
titled “The Will to Power as Art”, Heidegger takes up the topic of truth in the thinking of 
Nietzsche not only in relation to art, but as an exemplary moment in Heidegger’s own 
reflections on the history of Being. The question of the role of art within Nietzsche’s 
“metaphysical” project as a whole transitions in section 19 of the 1936/37 lecture course 
toward a more explicit discussion of how, in Heidegger’s reading, Nietzsche understands 
truth. The issue is also raised by Heidegger at this juncture as to whether Nietzsche 
sufficiently raises the question of truth, raises it to the point of “truly” overcoming the 
historical trajectory that began with Plato and the collapse51 of aletheia. Does Nietzsche 
pass over this challenge and remain fundamentally “metaphysical”? Does this passing 
 
over occur despite Nietzsche's overt attempts to liberate himself from that very tradition, 
and what he takes to be its most basic suppositions? 
In this section of the paper, I follow what I call Heidegger’s “canonical” reading52 
of Nietzsche through three key elaborations of it: section 19 of “The Will to Power as 
Art” from 1936/37, “Plato Doctrine of Truth” 1940, and section 234 of Contributions 
titled “The Question of Truth (Nietzsche)” 1936-38. In this canonical reading of 
Nietzsche, I show how Heidegger consistently places Nietzsche as a final step within the 
history of being’s withdrawal toward nihilism.53 More importantly for the purposes of 
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this paper, the extremity of Nietzsche’s place within this history makes him both the 
thinker least able to raise the question of truth in a non-metaphysical way, yet also 
uniquely capable of seeing the question of truth as worthy of interrogation. This 
clarification of Heidegger’s canonical reading of Nietzsche will then allow an exploration 
of a second, and more subterranean, reading of Nietzsche developed by Heidegger within 
the 1936/37 lecture course. This second reading will open the interpretive possibility of a 
more radical Nietzsche, a Nietzsche who raises the question of truth to an abyssal 
extreme that does not only invert, or even overcome, Platonism, but twists free of it.5455 
Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche in the 1930s hinges around the issue of truth, 
what Nietzsche understands by that well-worn word, and whether there is an opening 
within Nietzsche’s thought for a transformation of truth in its essence, and not a simple 
inversion. As Heidegger writes, “we must first ask upon which route of meaning the word 
‘truth’ moves for Nietzsche…” and he answers, “that it moves along the route which 
deviates from the essential route.”56 At his most unequivocal, Heidegger says that the 
question of the essence of truth is “missing in Nietzsche’s thought.”57 Though there is an 
 
obvious respect for Nietzsche, as his path possesses a certain degree of originality and 
historical importance for Heidegger, on the more specific and fundamental question of 
Nietzsche’s penetration into the essence of truth, Heidegger remains consistently 
skeptical. According to Heidegger, Nietzsche falls short of an authentic questioning into 
truth because, first of all, he takes truth as something evident. What Nietzsche takes for 
truth is not the essence of truth itself, but what Heidegger will consistently call “the true”. 
For Heidegger, Nietzsche’s understanding of truth moves within a conception of the truth 
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as “the true”. This “oversight” as Heidegger calls it, brings Nietzsche into philosophical 
communion with the “entire history of occidental philosophy since Plato and 
Aristotle.”5859 By Nietzsche's adoption of truth as “the true”, Heidegger is quick to show 
that this understanding moves within the notion of truth as accordance, or correctness, 
elaborated upon earlier in this paper. This is a truth that is a truth of knowledge. It 
becomes equivalent to say that something is true and to have knowledge of that said 
thing. For Heidegger, truth and knowledge become almost interchangeable terms 
implying the relation of accordance between a knowing intellect and the thing or object to 
be known. 
What might be called Heidegger’s evidence that Nietzsche holds such a 
 
conception of truth to be “the true”, comes from a reference to the well known remark 
493 from the Will to Power that reads, “Truth is the kind of error without which a certain 
species of life could 
not live.”60 Heidegger takes from this quote that, despite Nietzsche’s extreme position on 
 
truth, his understanding of truth as having an opposite, namely error, still places 
Nietzsche firmly within the metaphysical conception of truth as correctness. Heidegger 
writes, “that Nietzsche says ‘truth’ is an error; all these are advances of thoughtful 
inquiry. And yet! They all leave untouched the essence of truth itself.”61 Does Nietzsche 
here still maintain that oppositional and inessential relation between truth and untruth 
characteristic of truth as accordance? Is the metaphysical dichotomy of truth and falsity 
still upheld as Nietzsche blurs their boundaries and shifts the emphasis toward a primacy 
of falsity?62 As Heidegger writes, “Nietzsche’s conception of the essence of truth keeps to 
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the realm of the long tradition of Western thought, no matter how much Nietzsche’s 
particular interpretations of that conception deviate from earlier ones.”63 Heidegger 
consistently recognizes that Nietzsche’s thinking challenges the conception of truth that 
defines and confines Western thought. He also, with equal consistency, reads Nietzsche as 
still entirely determined by that very same conception of truth without qualifiers. An 
inversion of Platonism will always remain beholden to the essence of truth it inverts. By 
Heidegger’s “logic”, the philosophical movement of inversion will always be 
distinguished from a transformation of essence. Inversion, while appearing critical to 
what it inverts (i.e Platonism), shares a concealed essence with what it inverts. The 
question that needs to be posed here is then: Can Nietzsche inaugurate a transformation 
of the essence of truth while still adhering to the language of metaphysics, the language 
of truth (as in the “true world”) and error? A further development of this question requires 
first, a fuller account of Heidegger’s canonical reading of Nietzsche, in order to broach 
the topic of a second and more favorable reading present near the conclusion of the 
1936/37 lecture course. 
A second presentation of how Heidegger reads Nietzsche in the light of his 
 
development of the history of Being, comes from the 1932 essay “On Plato’s Doctrine of 
Truth”. Here Heidegger traces a change in the essence of truth that unfolded at the 
inception of Western thought. By following Plato’s allegory of the cave with minute 
attention to Plato's uses of metaphor, Heidegger delimits two different essences of truth 
contending with one another within the allegory. These two essences are truth as aletheia 
or unconcealment (the more originary essence), and truth as accordance. The former is 
30 
 
present in the allegory through the image of the cave and the “life and death struggle”64 
that the human faces in his/her movement out of the cave. The latter is present through 
the trajectory marked by the transition from the image of the fire to the image of the sun, 
and overall by the constant thematic of light and its blinding brilliance to the 
unaccustomed cave-dweller. In addition, Heidegger notes within the allegory there is not 
just the metaphorical presentation of two different essences of truth. In the laying out of 
the allegory there is also a marked transition away from truth as aletheia, as truth as 
correctness comes to greater and greater prominence. As Heidegger explains, “Certainly 
unhiddeness is mentioned in its various stages, but it is considered simply in terms of 
how it makes whatever appears be accessible in its visible form (edios).”65 This transition 
to the consideration of only the visible form necessitates a fundamental shift toward all 
the characteristics of truth as accordance. This shift includes the connection of truth to the 
act of knowing, as well as the privileging of sight and the direct look.66 
Once this transformation of truth into correctness comes to prevalence in Plato, it 
does not then wane in its power, as the eventuation of Plato’s thought passes further back 
into the annals of history. In Heidegger’s development of the history of Being, that 
history is in fact the continued empowerment of this prevailing of truth as correctness 
into increasingly more forgetful forms of humanism.67 As the locus of truth changes from 
beings themselves to becoming a “characteristic of human comportment”68, the 
 
experience of the revealing of beings as a whole falls further and further into oblivion. 
With this being-historical tendency in place, Heidegger then must read Nietzsche’s 
thinking as the ultimate and most “humanistic” (i.e. oblivious to the question of Being) 
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stage of this history. Not only this, but Nietzsche must also bear an extensive relation to 
Plato. This is first because every figure within this historical trajectory must bear the 
mark, so to speak, of the predominance of the eidos, or visible form, on their 
philosophizing. Secondly, by coming near the possible conclusion (or exhaustion) of this 
history, Nietzsche bears a privileged relation to Plato as he is uniquely exposed to the full 
possibilities and consequences of this essence of truth that was brought to the fore by 
Plato twenty four hundred years ago.69 It is important to reiterate that in this history 
Heidegger is attempting to trace, it can neither be called progressive (i.e. Hegel) or 
regressive (i.e Rousseau), although the regressive understanding might come closer to 
grasping the directionality of this history. This is not a linear history, but one that bears at 
least two trends. There is, first, the trend toward the greater and greater oblivion or 
abandonment of beings by Being that co-exists with an ever-intensifying subject- 
centeredness. Yet, there is also a trend of preparation for a future overcoming and a 
consequent new, or other, beginning. By the exhaustion of the possibilities of 
metaphysics, metaphysics brings itself to the possibility of its own self-overcoming. 
In this 1932 essay, Heidegger also returns to note 493 of The Will to Power, to 
further reinforce Nietzsche’s extreme position within the unfolding history of 
metaphysics. In his commentary to remark 493 Heidegger writes, “If for Nietzsche truth 
is a kind of error, then its essence consists in a way of thinking that always, indeed, 
necessarily, classifies the real… sets up as the supposedly real something that does not 
correspond -i.e. something incorrect and thus erroneous.”70 Even in what amounts to a 
parody of accordance, there appears, for Heidegger, no possibility of a Nietzschean 
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challenge to the prevailing of truth as accordance. Nietzsche’s playing with the most 
extreme possibilities of the words “truth” and “error” still condemns him to further 
ensnarement within the paradigm of correctness. For Nietzsche, to claim that truth is an 
error supposes the conception of truth whereby falsity is determined by the non- 
accordance of statement and thing. His changing of the value of these words bears in no 
way on their essence. What we might call the “emptying out” of truth in note 493 of The 
Will To Power, for Heidegger, has no bearing on an essential transformation in thought 
toward a more originary essencing of truth. If anything, Nietzsche has become even 
further removed from the ungrounded glimmer of aletheia that was present in Plato’s 
allegory of the cave. 
It is clear that in section nineteen of the 1936/37 lecture course and in the 1932 
essay, Heidegger unequivocally finds in Nietzsche’s philosophy no openings toward a 
fundamentally new possibility of thought, and that Nietzsche’s thinking is the 
“unconditioned fulfillment”71 of the change in the essence of truth that became prominent 
amid the time of Plato and became secured in the Christianization of the Western world. 
Yet, it cannot be denied that Nietzsche is the thinker that, other than Heidegger, went 
furthest in questioning and problematizing the deepest suppositions of Western thought, 
especially truth and the “true world”. If this is so, how does Heidegger justify his reading 
of Nietzsche as the “most unrestrained Platonist in the history of metaphysics”?72 By 
turning to section 234 of Contributions, I further elaborate on this question of the dual 
sense of Nietzsche’s place in the history of Being, in preparation for finding a more 
favorable reading of Nietzsche latent in the 1936/37 lecture course. 
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51 The collapse of aletheia refers to the way in which the originary Greek experience of 
the clearing was not able to be properly grounded by Greek philosophy, and hence 
collapsed in upon itself. This collapse opened the way for the coming to prominence of 
the Platonic Idea, and for the proposition to be understood as the loci of truth. See 
Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event sections 73, 116, 211. 
52 The term “canonical view” is used by William Melaney (in his essay “Heidegger’s 
Allegory of Reading: On Nietzsche and the Tradition”) to describe Heidegger’s 
interpretation of Nietzsche that reads Nietzsche as “an almost perfect demonstration of 
how the forgetfulness of Being continues the dominant positions of modern 
metaphysics.”(223) I will be attempting to complicate and challenge this “canonical” 
reading of Nietzsche by multiple routes. 
53 Alan D. Schrift, in his book Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation, lays out 
Heidegger’s three “methodological choices” that, in Schrift’s opinion, make these 
Nietzsche lectures more about Heidegger’s own philosophical project than they serve in 
giving a useful exegesis of Nietzsche’s own philosophical corpus. The first of these 
choices is Heidegger’s decision to locate “Nietzsche’s philosophy proper in his 
unpublished Nachlass”, guided by the opinion that “the true doctrine of a thinker is left 
unsaid in what he says.”(15) The second choice is to read Nietzsche philosophy as 
forming a system centered around the doctrines of eternal recurrence, will to power, and 
nihilism. The third choice is that Heidegger views “all serious philosophical thinking as 
metaphysics”(19), meaning that there is a guiding view to Heidegger’s reading of 
Nietzsche that consists in posing the question as to how Nietzsche thinks the being of 
beings as a whole, and whether he can raise the question of being as such. Schrift claims 
that the “hermeneutic consequences” of this “metaphysicalization of Nietzsche qua 
serious thinker are enormous.”(20) I agree wholeheartedly with Schrift on this claim of 
the enormity of effect that Heidegger’s choices have upon his reading of Nietzsche. 
Though, I do not think this effect is altogether as problematic as Schrift argues. Similarly 
to Deleuze’s books on Spinoza, Nietzsche, and Bergson, Heidegger’s reading of 
Nietzsche injects a much needed dose of philosophical imagination into the hermeneutic 
possibilities of reading Nietzsche. While such speculative studies may strike some as bad 
scholarship, this says more about the state of contemporary scholarship, in its dearth of 
risk-taking, than it does about Deleuze and Heidegger. Such complaints against 
Heidegger in fact, by my estimate, invoke a correspondence theory of truth in arguing 
that Heidegger’s reading is not staying in line with the ‘true’ Nietzsche. If his studies on 
Nietzsche were gauged by what they revealed (aletheia) about the possibilities of being 
itself, instead of whether they conformed to the ‘actual’ Nietzsche, this discussion would 
be a mute point; as his studies are undisputedly revealing, even if it is not always 
‘Nietzsche’ who is revealed. 
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54 It is important here to clarify the three terms utilized by Heidegger in describing the 
relation of Nietzsche's thought to Platonism: inversion (Umkehr), overturning 
(Überwindung), and twisting free (Herausdrehung). Inversion refers to the most basic 
and least original phase of Nietzsche’s thought where, within the two-world schema of 
Platonism, Nietzsche simply reverses the valuations of the super-sensuous and sensuous. 
Now the sensuous is the ‘true’ and the super-sensuous is the ‘false’. This inversion is best 
captured in statement five of “How The True World Became a Fable” and for Heidegger 
represents Nietzsche’s positivist phase of the late 1870s and early 1880s. “Overturning” 
refers to Nietzsche’s explicitly stated project in the final year of his productivity, where 
he would go beyond a mere inversion and, through a reevaluation of all values, overcome 
the basis of Platonism itself: nihilistic values. “Twisting free” is Heidegger’s term for the 
possibility in Nietzsche’s philosophy of a sufficient break with Platonism. This would be 
where Nietzsche’s thought would no longer find its sole ground in the fundamental 
decisions of metaphysics (i.e. reality/appearance, being/becoming, being/thinking). As 
John Sallis explains, twisting free would require “not merely the inversion of the 
hierarchical opposition between the true and the apparent but a transformation of the very 
ordering structure governing both the Platonic subordination and its inversion… that 
there be not merely inversion but also displacement.”(“Twisting Free: Being to an Extent 
Sensible,” 2) 
55 The question, to phrase it in terms used by John Sallis, is: Does Nietzsche bring a 
“second moment” into play beyond his moment of inversion? (Double Truth, p.87) What 
I will try to make clear in this paper is that there is present, in both the early and later 
writings of Nietzsche, an extra-metaphysical displacement (a “second moment” beyond 
inversion) of truth different, but commensurate, to that of Heidegger’s. 
56 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche Volume 1: The Will to Power as Art, 148 
57  ibid. 149 
58  ibid. 149 
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59 The difficulty in determining the extent to which Nietzsche twists free of Platonism 
(and its conception of truth) is redoubled by Nietzsche’s inability to resist speaking of 
truth in the Platonic sense, even if part of a rhetorical strategy to destabilize the very 
concept. As David Farrell Krell writes, “the word truth is one that Nietzsche is always 
embarrassed to use, and yet it is a word he cannot renounce.”(Infectious Nietzsche, 35) 
The challenge will be to show that Nietzsche has an extra-metaphysical understanding of 
truth grounding his use of truth in the metaphysical sense of correctness. Krell sees such 
an extra-metaphysical understanding of truth present even from the beginning of 
Nietzsche’s thought. As Krell writes, “truth, at least as adequation of assertion to state of 
affairs, is a position that is already surpassed by the time of The Birth of 
Tragedy.”(Infectious Nietzsche, 36) In support of this claim, Krell cites Nietzsche, “Here 
the opposition of a true and an apparent world is missing: there is but one world, and this 
one is false, cruel, contradictory, seductive, and without meaning… A world thus 
construed is the true world.”(The Birth of Tragedy, preface section 5, xvii) Later in this 
thesis, I argue that The Brith of Tragedy stands as evidence that Nietzsche is an extra- 
metaphysical thinker with respect to truth for a reason different than what is here 
proposed by David Krell. Krell claims Nietzsche is an extra-metaphysical thinker of truth 
as early as The Birth of Tragedy because, at that stage, Nietzsche is contesting the two 
world model in favor of a single world of the false. I see this as not going far enough in 
recognizing how Nietzsche contests metaphysical truth in his early period. In distinction 
to Krell, I claim Nietzsche’s main strategy of contesting metaphysics and its 
understanding of truth in The Birth of Tragedy is through his development of an essential 
concealment through the conceptual personae of Dionysius. As I discussed with “How 
the True World became a Fable,” eliminating the true world in favor of a world of 
appearances is only the commencement of an inversion of metaphysics. To overcome, or 
even twist free of, metaphysics requires a more radical transformation. I claim this more 
radical transformation occurs in Nietzsche as he discusses modes of concealment such as 
Dionysius and the “unhistorical” (from the second of the Untimely Meditations). 
60 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, p.272 
61 ibid. 149 
62 If one is to fall into the liar’s paradox and say “This is a lie,” that sentence will be, 
strictly speaking, neither true or false. It cannot even be false, because to be false is to fail 
to accord with the proper (and true) idea of the proposition, but there cannot be an idea of 
the false, otherwise it would be a ‘true’ idea and hence would fail to capture the very 
falsity of ‘the false’. The very speaking of a paradox such as “this is a lie” recoils upon 
and into itself unceasingly. Paradoxes can be neither true or false, but only the incessant 
motion of a thinking that can find no idea to rest upon. I find that to linger in a paradox is 
to already experience something “monstrous” and beyond truth and falsity. 
63 ibid. 153 
64 Pathmarks, 172 
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65 ibid. 172 
66 Could it be that smell was the privileged sense with some pre-Platonic philosophers 
instead of sight? John Sallis in his essay “Hades”, explores how the sense of smell is for 
the pre-Platonic philosopher, Heraclitus, the sense which comports us to concealment. 
Fragment B 98 of Heraclitus reads, “Souls smell in Hades.” Hades here carries the 
connotation of concealment, as Hades was the god of the underworld in Greek 
mythology. With respect to this fragment, Sallis asks the question, “But why is that mode 
of comportment in which man comports himself to concealment identified (by 
Heraclitus) as corresponding to the sense of smell?”(Delimitations, 190) It could be that 
smell comports us to concealment better than the other senses because smell is the sense 
"least capable of drawing things out of their withdrawal.”(Delimitations, 191) 
67 As Heidegger writes, “The beginning of metaphysics in the thought of Plato is at the 
same time the beginning of ‘humanism’.”(Pathmarks 181) 
68 ibid. 177 
69 Heidegger makes the placement of Nietzsche within this historical trajectory 
abundantly clear when he writes, “Insofar as ‘value’ and interpretation in terms of 
‘values’ are what sustains Nietzsche’s metaphysics… and since for him all knowledge 
takes its departure from the metaphysical origin of ‘value’, to that extent Nietzsche is the 
most unrestrained Platonist in the history of metaphysics.” (Pathmarks 182) 
70  ibid. 179 
71  ibid. 181 
72  ibid. 174 
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CHAPTER IV 
COMPLICATING THE CANONICAL READING 
 
 
Heidegger begins section 234 (“The question of truth (Nietzsche)”) of 
Contributions by writing, “The last one who asked the question of ‘truth’ and asked about 
it most passionately, is Nietzsche.”73 At a time contemporaneous to the 1936/37 lecture 
course, Heidegger concedes that Nietzsche is in fact not only raising the question of truth, 
a questioning that would seem at odds with his more critical assessments of Nietzsche 
brought to our attention earlier in this paper, but is doing so “most passionately”, as a 
fundamental aspect of his philosophical project. With the passage, could Heidegger be 
reading Nietzsche as on the way to a questioning of truth that could be considered as, at 
least, a preliminary or preparatory attempt at what Heidegger himself sought in his essay 
“On the Essence of Truth”? Heidegger again reiterates this possibly altered reading of 
Nietzsche as a passionate questioner of truth by adding a couple paragraphs later, “To be 
sure, inasmuch as the question of truth stands at the center of Nietzsche’s last 
meditations… , everything acquires a new vitality.”74 Could this be the beginning of 
Heidegger seeing Nietzsche as a transitional figure on the way toward Heidegger’s own 
original questioning into truth, instead of as the “unconditioned fulfillment”, or dead end, 
of metaphysics taken in the sense of truth as accordance? This is unlikely, as in the first 
quote cited above there are quotes around the word truth. This is implying that Heidegger 
is understanding the questioning of Nietzsche to not break with truth as correctness, 
despite Nietzsche’s important step of questioning that truth from within its immanent 
38 
 
unfolding. In the second quote, the final word of the quote, ‘vitality”, may hint that 
Nietzsche will bring this question of truth into the orbit of the question of life understood 
as the will to power. This will be to take away the primacy of the questioning of truth and 
will be an incarnating of the “essence of truth back into life.” Heidegger clarifies this 
questioning present in Nietzsche by saying that “Nietzsche does not ask the question of 
truth in an originary way.” So while the inclusion of Nietzsche as a passionate questioner 
of ‘truth’ lends to the beginning of a more favorable reading of Nietzsche as a thinker 
perhaps on the way to an extra-metaphysical stance, Heidegger quickly reels back this 
possibility and reinscribes this questioning back within a systematic project of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy to think “life” as will to power, that “center of will and power 
which wills its own enhancement and surmounting.”75 
Nietzsche’s questioning into truth nonetheless draws again the attention of 
 
Heidegger in section 234 when the latter writes, “Nietzsche seems to inquire deepest into 
the essence of truth when he asks, ‘What is the meaning of all will to truth?’ And when he 
calls knowledge of this question ‘our problem’.’’76 Again Heidegger is here expanding 
the possibilities of Nietzsche’s philosophy beyond the narrow confines elaborated upon in 
section 19 of the 1936/37 lecture course and the 1932 Plato essay. This is because 
Nietzsche is, at least on the surface, preparing the way for the question of truth to become 
again the central and basic question of philosophy as such. But this questioning is already 
couched within a language of will, and so Heidegger’s commentary on this very point is 
that, in Nietzsche’s questioning into truth, truth is already taken in the usual sense of the 
true, the accordant. This questioning, while an important moment within metaphysics, 
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nonetheless already assumes and moves within an unquestionable taking of truth to be 
“the true” and is hence a faux questioning. The thought of Nietzsche does not rise to the 
point of unsettling this metaphysical essence of truth from its concealed dominion over 
the whole of Western thought. In Heidegger’s estimate, “truth is taken by Nietzsche as 
something settled.”77 While Nietzsche questions into the meaning of truth, and even 
problematizes the question of truth in a way that no one before him was able to do: truth, 
in its essence as accordance, prevails unquestioned. 
In this lengthy section 234 of Contributions, Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche 
 
expands to include the possibility of Nietzsche to begin to be understood as a 
transitional78 thinker. Nietzsche can be read here as a thinker whose ensnarement in the 
most extreme possibilities of metaphysics both enables him to begin to raise the question 
of truth in a way no one before him was capable, as well as limits him in this questioning 
to only a partial or fragmentary advancement. While section 234 of Contributions 
complicates Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche, it by no means runs contrary to his 
interpretations developed in the 1936/37 lecture course and 1932 essay, as seen so far. In 
returning to the 1936/37 lecture course, I will be attempting to excavate a more extra- 
metaphysical reading of Nietzsche in the seams of the overt “canonical” interpretation 
now laid out in some detail. Whereas Heidegger’s explicitly stated stance on Nietzsche 
shows to bear a consistent message, I do not believe his own texts always align with that 
expressed intent. This development of a second reading of Nietzsche within the 1936/37 
lecture course will then not be one that leans on the intentions of Heidegger himself, but 
could be what one might call a reading of the text against the author. My advancement of 
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a second reading of the first Heidegger lecture on Nietzsche will then be an expansion of 
a certain possibility of the text, a possibility clearly present, but underdeveloped and 
perhaps willfully ignored, by Heidegger himself. 
 
 
 
73 Contributions to Philosophy: Of The Event, p. 285 
74  ibid. 286 
75  ibid. 287 
76  ibid. 287 
77  ibid. 288 
78 This is the transitioning from out of the closure of metaphysics into the opening of 
some non-metaphysical space, whether that be the space of the Nietzschean 
“Übermensch” or Heidegger’s “Other Beginning”. Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 
in particular, utilizes the language and metaphoric of bridges and bridging in order to 
make the important point that philosophy’s task should be one of not only critiquing the 
present, but ultimately, one of surpassing it through the creation of bridges. As Nietzsche 
writes, “The now and the past on earth - alas, my friends, that is what I find most 
unendurable; and I should not know how to live if I were not also a seer of that which 
must come. A seer, a willer, a creator, a future himself and a bridge to the future - and all, 
also, as it were, a cripple at this bridge: all this is Zarathustra.”(Thus Spoke Zarathustra: 
Second Part, On Redemption, from The Portable Nietzsche, 250) Here there are two 
senses in which Zarathustra is transitional. The first is in how Zarathustra serves as a 
bridge to the future through his three qualities of being a seer, a willer and a creator. The 
second is by Zarathustra’s state of incapacity before the bridge itself. Though a seer of the 
transition, he is incapable of bringing it to enactment himself. I think the extent to which 
Nietzsche can be read as a transitional thinker depends less on how acutely or accurately 
he prophesies what is to come, but on the self-awareness he displays in admitting how his 
philosophy boldly triumphs in falling short of being the enactment of a transition. I see 
being a transitional thinker as not limited solely to the enactment of a transition, but as 
one who, like the Gods of ancient Greece, gives signs and points by hints. A sign, while 
showing itself, “at the same time only foreshadows or portends, and hence does not 
completely unveil but simultaneously shrouds.”(Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, 37) 
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CHAPTER V 
 
A SECOND READING OF NIETZSCHE IN HEIDEGGER’S 1936/1937 
LECTURE COURSE 
 
 
To pursue this second and less metaphysical reading of Nietzsche, I focus on the 
final two sections of the 1936/37 lecture course: sections 24 and 25. First, I tease out an 
intriguing feature of Heidegger’s exposition of Nietzsche’s famous piece, “How the True 
Word Became a Fable.” Then I bring to light certain consequences of Heidegger’s 
discussion of semblance as having both a significant and yet enigmatic, or ambiguous, 
position within the final developments of Nietzsche’s own thought. I then support this 
second reading of Heidegger’s lecture course by turning to Heidegger’s 1935 lecture 
course, Introduction to Metaphysics, in order to continue developing the importance of 
the concept of semblance for a philosophizing that transgresses the limits of metaphysics 
as defined by truth as accordance. 
Beginning in section 24 of the 1936/37 lecture course, the focus of the lecture 
shifts away from a discussion of Plato’s theory of art as mimesis (which was covered in 
detail in sections 20-23) back to a more focused discussion on Nietzsche’s philosophy 
itself and the unique challenge it presents to the philosophical tradition synonymous with 
Platonism. The zenith of section 24 involves a point by point commentary by Heidegger 
on “How the True World Became a Fable”, and will require close attention if a second 
reading of Nietzsche can begin to be teased out. The “Fable” contains six points, each 
standing for one of the six divisions of the history of Platonism, a history constructed by 
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Nietzsche in his final year of productivity.79 The “Fable” begins with a terse summary of 
 
how Plato understood the “true world” as something “attainable for the wise, the pious, 
the virtuous”80, and according to this understanding, Plato was himself the true. “He lives 
in it, he is it.” Heidegger writes at the end of his commentary on number one that here, 
 
with Plato,“the ‘true world’ is not yet the object of a doctrine; it is the power of Dasein; it 
is what lights up in becoming present; it is pure radiance without cover.”81 Plato’s stance 
still bears the mark of inceptual Greek thought. His thought still possesses an adherence 
to phusis as the emerging forth into presence of nature and the holding power of that 
radiance. Also with Plato, we cannot yet say that the ‘true world’ transcends the apparent, 
but is almost immanent with the appearances. What we might call the true enemy of 
Nietzsche’s history only emerges after Plato, in the birth of Platonism which is not to be 
confused with Plato himself. Statement two begins to establish the “unattainability”82 of 
the true world, as Plato’s thought is twisted into the mold of Christian doctrine and 
promised to its “sinners who repent.” Statements number two to four begin to catalogue 
the growth of a scission between the two worlds of truth and appearance and that 
scission’s increasing distance as this history unfolds through its Kantian and German 
Idealist permutations. 
Statement five is where Nietzsche’s own place within this history is first 
thematized by Nietzsche himself. Statement five reads, “5. The ‘true world’ - an idea 
which is of use for nothing, which is no longer even obligating - an idea become useless, 
superfluous, consequently, a refuted idea: let us abolish it!”83 It is here that Heidegger 
notes that Nietzsche is designating the “first segment of his own philosophy”84. In this 
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fifth statement, Nietzsche is placing his own earlier philosophy within the context of the 
fable’s history. This earlier philosophy was itself already an inversion of Platonism 
insofar as the supersensuous world was deemed useless, refuted and deserving of 
abolition. Yet, such a move of abolition does not go far enough. As Heidegger notes, “the 
vacant niche of the higher world remains”. Even though one is left by the fifth statement 
with only the apparent world, by abolishing the true or supersensuous world, there is still 
a tacit affirmation of the two world schema in that very act of abolition. There is 
inversion without displacement. This is why Heidegger will fervently distinguish the 
sense of overcoming or inversion from his own attempts at an essential transformation of 
essence. The former will always retain the trace, if not the whole schema of what it 
overturns, while the latter seeks to make the leap into another beginning. Nietzsche’s 
overturning must then go one step further. With the first abolition of the true world, there 
is then the demand for an even greater abolition: the abolishment of the apparent itself, 
and hence the two-world schema that undergirds it. 
Statement six carries out what I will call the meta-abolition of even the 
supporting schema itself. It reads, “6. The true world we abolished: which world was left? 
The apparent one perhaps?… But no! Along with the true world we have also abolished 
the apparent one!”85 Here a second abolition occurs, but it does not occur in the same 
mode as did the first. In statement five, Nietzsche said “let us abolish it!”. This is 
signaling an active abolition or overcoming of the the ‘true world’. Yet, in statement six 
Nietzsche states that we have abolished the apparent one. In Statement six, the past tense 
construction is used to show the occurrence of what I am calling the meta-abolition of the 
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schema of the true and the apparent. What is important in the past tense construction is 
that the temporality of the event cannot be reduced to having ever occurred in the active 
present. It is not only that “I” did not actively take on this course of action, but going one 
step further, the action appears to have always already occurred. Similarly to Nietzsche’s 
statement on the death of God that “we have killed him,”86 the past tense construction 
shows that Nietzsche understands great events as occurring behind the back of the 
thinker, as an unwilled event of thought that drives the thinker toward something strange 
and unrepresentable. Where are we by the end of statement six? What is there left to 
think? 
Heidegger’s interpretation of the sixth statement is how it “shows that, and how, 
(Nietzsche) must advance beyond himself and beyond sheer abolition of the 
supersensuous.”87 If statement five was the metaphysical position of Nietzsche himself, 
statement six is his own self-overcoming, his own moment of radical ec-stasy. Nietzsche's 
 
zenith of thought is then recognized by Heidegger as not being reducible to an inversion 
of Platonism. There is here a second overcoming, but according to Heidegger not one of 
metaphysics. This second overcoming is that of the philosopher himself. Nietzsche’s 
“Fable” contains its own overcoming, its own moment of erasure by the sixth statement, 
equally signifying the overcoming of Nietzsche the metaphysician. The terse style of 
statement six leads to an overcoming of its own sense of overcoming as it breaks down 
before the reader’s eyes into the terse clarity of a few fragmentary words and phrases, 
“Midday; moment of the shortest shadow; end of the longest error; highpoint of 
humanity; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA.”88 Insofar as Nietzsche writes into the “Fable” his 
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philosophy’s overcoming as well as his own, what we might call Nietzsche’s final 
position is that of a double overcoming.89 The question now stands: is a double 
overcoming sufficient to pose the claim that Nietzsche, in this movement of double 
overcoming, is also undergoing a transformation in the essence of truth? Is this where we 
can finally say that Nietzsche “twists free” of metaphysics? As Heidegger’s writes, “A 
new hierarchy and new valuation mean that the ordering structure must be changed. To 
that extent, overturning Platonism must become a twisting free of it.”90 Yet, are we not 
talking here of Nietzsche overcoming even the need for an ordering structure or schema, 
overcoming the need for a new system? Nietzsche has not only actively abolished the 
“true world”, but has undergone a passive abolition of the very support schema that cut 
being into two (i.e being/thinking, reality/appearance, etc.). The question is less one of 
twisting free of Platonism through the institution of a “new hierarchy”, but rather: Does 
this double overcoming constitute a change in the experience of the essence of truth? The 
clearest sign that Nietzsche, by the sixth statement, is treading on new (abyssal) ground 
comes from the style in which the statement concludes. With “Incipit Zarathustra” there 
is an exhaustion of the possibilities of language, and the communication between writer 
and reader becomes one guided primarily by what is not written, in that Nietzsche cannot 
continue the fable. There is no seventh statement because it has not yet occurred in 
history. The seventh statement is an impossibility, because Nietzsche knows all too well 
of the moral/metaphysical suppositions that guide his discourse and which let him only 
signal the radical outside of metaphysics that he so fiercely intuits. The reticence 
Nietzsche manifests at the cusp of this double overcoming does not think merely within 
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the essence of truth as accordance. Unable to make the leap beyond himself and therefore 
metaphysics as such, he points to unexplorable territory. By using the language of 
metaphysics to absurdity, followed by reticence, Nietzsche problematizes the logic of 
accordance by dangling his words over an abyss and asking his reader, ‘where are we 
now?’ Nietzsche’s “Fable” is supple evidence that he fathoms some other essencing of 
truth that is not merely the inversion, or even the twisting free, of the first one. This is not 
to claim that Nietzsche is well on his way onto the path of Heidegger carried out in the 
“On the Essence of Truth” essay. Instead, it is to claim that Nietzsche is on his own path 
toward rethinking the essence of truth (and hence the truth of essence), one that can be 
considered different in approach, but perhaps commensurate in scale and greatness, to 
that of Heidegger.91 
A second significant point in Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche arises from an 
 
intensive discussion of Nietzsche’s use of the concept of semblance (Schein) within his 
final year of productivity92. Here again, I show how Heidegger’s own elaboration of 
Nietzsche lends further evidence to an extra-metaphysical reading of the great philologist 
from Basel. The following discussion pursues two questions: How does Nietzsche reach 
this notion of semblance?93 How does semblance upend metaphysics understood as 
grounded in the essence of truth as accordance? 
 
In section 25 of the 1936/37 lecture course, Heidegger charts the continuance of 
Nietzsche’s thought beyond the dual abolition of the supersensuous and the sensuous 
undergone in his “overturning of Platonism”94. In Heidegger’s reading, if Nietzsche is to 
continue beyond the “Fable”, reality is to be “defined afresh.”95 This requires giving a 
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new meaning, a new interpretation to the sensuous. For if the sensuous is to no longer be 
determined in a relation to the supersensuous, then the sensuous can no longer be what 
merely appears. The meaning of appearance itself requires a new formulation, a new 
essence. The problem for Nietzsche is then how can the sensuous, as what traditionally 
has “merely” appeared and is therefore something that can not determine the “what” or 
essence of beings themselves, “constitute reality proper”?96 
In Heidegger’s reading, Nietzsche, beginning from a nascent understanding of the 
“living”, takes each focal point of life, which is always a striving of force against other 
forces, to create for itself an “angle of vision.”97 From this angle of vision singular to 
each living point of force, a horizon is engendered, “within whose scope something can 
come forward into appearance for him at all.” Each of these interpretive horizons 
generated by the striving of each living point of force is what Nietzsche will call a 
“perspective”. And, of course, Nietzsche goes one step further in stating that being itself 
is nothing but these perspectives, hence, writes Heidegger, “the perspectival is the basic 
condition of all life.”98 Now, Nietzsche takes an important step beyond this first, 
metaphysical sense of the perspectival99, a step documented by Heidegger in his 1936/37 
 
lecture course, yet not given the emphasis that, in my reading, it deserves. With the 
perspectival, one conceives of many little monadic creatures each striving, each 
interpreting the other forces it interacts with so as to form its unique horizon. Yet in this 
first conception, there is still the being in-itself of the monadic creature, or some 
substance-like being preceding this striving and horizon-forming. There is the 
supposition of a world in-itself of substantive creatures that grounds this first explanation 
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of the perspectival. This vision of the world is steeped in the biological and borrows the 
language of life-philosophy before turning to the implications of the multiplicity of 
horizons or perspectives. Nietzsche himself challenges this more biologistic 
understanding of perspectival reality when he writes: “Fundamental question: whether the 
perspectival is proper to the being, and is not only a form of observation, a reaction 
between different beings? Do the various forces stand in relation, so that the relation is 
tied to a perceptual optics? That would be possible if all Being were essentially something 
which perceives.”100 Nietzsche clarifies that the sense of the perspectival developing here 
is not as simple as each living force having its own perspective through which it observes 
the world. Being is not simply the interaction, or “reactions”, of various beings as each 
respectively strives to dominate through its own singular perspective. This is no longer 
the straightforward metaphysical question of what the being of beings is, a question 
which could be answered in the Leibnizian fashion: it is monadic. Nietzsche is here 
questioning further than could Leibniz (despite all the correctly identified similarities that 
Heidegger notes between the two great thinkers). In my reading, the perspectival alters its 
sense here to not simply be my view upon the world, my unique way of making the world 
come to a stand, but, prior to this, to be the way beings themselves essence as perceptual, 
as freely shining forth in appearing. This appearing is not constituted by active, living 
beings upon an inanimate world, but is an appearing/perceiving that precedes the 
perceiver, an appearing/perceiving that grounds even the possibility of perceiving 
errantly. Being is preeminently view-giving, or as Heidegger will formulate Nietzsche’s 
name for being: “Perspectival-perceptual”101. 
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Now we are in a position to see how semblance is to become both a crucial 
thought and enigma for Nietzsche. As Being is understood in its essence to be 
perspectival-perceptual, semblance can no longer exist as extrinsic to the real. In the “On 
the Essence of Truth” essay, falsity was understood as non-accordance and hence 
inessential to the essence of truth taken as accordance. In a similar manner, metaphysical 
thought expelled semblance from the being of the real. Semblance is what appears to be 
so, but is in truth not so. We have reached reality, or ‘the true’, when semblancing has 
been dispatched with and we are left with “the real”, and only the real. With Nietzsche’s 
radicalization of the perspectival-perceptual, semblance can no longer be considered as 
an incidental and extraneous occurrence to being. The two (being - semblance), just like 
truth and untruth once understood from their ground in the revealing-concealing of 
aletheia, can no longer be held decisively apart. As Heidegger writes, semblance now 
becomes “proper to the essence of the real.”102 One consequence that follows is the 
introduction of an indeterminateness that is not merely the fault of the process of 
 
cognition, but is how being comes to presence. The possibility of a true or unified- 
unifiable perspective upon the world is thrown into question. As Heidegger writes, “In 
such a multiplicity the univocity of the particular perspective in which the actual in any 
given case stands is lost.”103 Reality can no longer be cleaved into the true and false, for 
the ‘true’ view upon things that could guide such a cleavage is not only absent, but any 
“view” can now be understood as the ‘true’ view of things. Going further, we cannot say 
any longer that all these views that may have a possible claim to “truth” are simply 
appearances, for that would implicitly involve some grasp of the ‘true’ view that may 
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determine them as such. The concept of semblance functions at the height of Nietzsche’s 
thought as the “apparentness as such proper to reality”104, the self-showing of being that 
precedes the very distinction of the true and the apparent (or false). This more 
indeterminate and fundamental notion of semblance falls only into the form of either 
truth or “mere appearance” when what becomes manifest in one perspective petrifies and 
is taken to be the sole definitive appearance. One could say that here true and false 
perspectives (“reality” and “appearance”) are produced from out of the unformed chora105 
of semblance. Nietzsche echoes this “chora-like” understanding of semblance at the basis 
of his philosophy when he writes, “I do not posit ‘semblance’ in opposition to ‘reality’, 
but on the contrary take semblance to be the reality which resists transformation into an 
imaginative ‘world of truth’.”106 Before there is a world, either true or false, there is first 
semblancing or a fundamental shining forth.107 This is not a shining forth of something, 
 
for that would be to understand Nietzsche under the biological paradigm wherein 
coherent entities precede and actively structure and control this initial shining forth or 
semblancing. When Heidegger reaches the zenith of his discussion of this exceptional 
notion in Nietzsche’s philosophy, he describes this being-real of semblance as a “bringing 
forward into appearance, a letting radiate; that it is in itself a shining. Reality is 
radiance.”108 
What should we make of this? If what we may call the real, in its essence, 
“shines” before it may be properly determined as either true or false (these as understood 
under the prevalence of truth as accordance), then Nietzsche here has stepped beyond an 
inversion of metaphysics. His thought is no longer on the path to “truth”, if we are still to 
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understand by that word the truth of how things must really be in-themselves. He has 
entered upon a path of questioning that has perhaps removed him from his stated task of 
the “reevalution of values” and delivered him unto a genuine questioning of being itself, 
of how being gives, or does not give, itself. It is in this way that we can now better 
understand statement 493 from The Will To Power. “Truth is the kind of error without 
which a certain kind of being could not live.”109 In one sense the truth, understood by the 
essence of accordance, is false insofar as the process of taking-something for true is to fix 
a fluid process in place, and hence “falsify” it. But we are now at the point to hear 
another sense to this statement of Nietzsche’s. By having gone beyond the notion of error 
as simply what does not accord (I said “apple” when it was in fact a ‘peach’), Nietzsche 
has found the essence of the false, as semblance, to be more basic to being than either the 
‘truth’ or the ‘falsity’ of being in accord. Error does not mean “mere error” for Nietzsche 
any more than appearance can mean “mere appearance”. With semblance (Schein), error 
is thought from its essence as a first letting-radiate of being, that being is first view- 
giving. Nietzsche’s meditations have led him to the very origin of the scission into the 
true and the false, into the truth of an ambiguity that cannot be wholly true, wholly 
accordant with itself. By having thought untruth to its ground in the initial “bringing forth 
into appearance”110 characterized by semblance, Nietzsche has not only challenged the 
limits of metaphysics, but has also challenged Heidegger’s estimation of his 
philosophical limits from section 19 of the 1936/37 lecture course.111 
In section 19, Heidegger claimed definitively that “Nietzsche’s conception of the 
essence of truth keeps to the realm of the long tradition of Western thought, no matter 
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how much Nietzsche’s particular interpretations of that conception deviate from earlier 
ones.”112 Yet we have now a Heidegger who six sections later, in section twenty-five, 
opens his reading of Nietzsche, perhaps accidentally, to possibilities that challenge the 
canonical reading presented earlier. There is now a path in Heidegger’s interpretation that 
brings Nietzsche into a certain consonance, not with the end of the history of Being, but 
with its inceptual first beginning.113 Within Nietzsche’s questioning into the essence of 
the false as semblance, is there the possibility of a distinctively pre-Socratic resonance? 
Could Nietzsche be a Greek first, and a nihilist second?114 
To get a hold onto how Nietzsche’s thematization of semblance transcends the 
limits of the metaphysical essence of truth, I will turn to Heidegger’s 1935 lecture course, 
Introduction to Metaphysics, to give a fuller elaboration of the extra-metaphysical 
tendencies at the root of Nietzsche’s philosophy.115 The struggle of Greek Dasein in the 
midst of the belonging together of being and seeming, and the rich sense of semblance 
(Schein) as part and parcel of the emergent power of phusis, will help to shed light on the 
discussion of semblance given earlier. This will be to distance ourselves from the 
Nietzsche-Platonism connection and to move toward reading Nietzsche as closer akin in 
important respects to the pre-Socratics.116 Through this elaboration, I will begin to make 
the case that Nietzsche’s most lucid meditations on truth not only are critical of the 
interpretation of truth as accordance, but show the beginnings of an understanding of 
truth in the aletheaic tension of revealing-concealing. 
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79 There can be little doubt of the resemblances between Nietzsche’s history of Platonism 
and Heidegger’s own history of Being. Both histories identify an important turn within 
the being of beings with Plato and proceed to expose a mostly regressive history that 
intensifies this change in being. Such a commentary on these resemblances deserves far 
more space than this paper can allot. 
80 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Portable Nietzsche, 485 
81 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche: Vol 1, 205 
82 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Portable Nietzsche, 485 
83 ibid. 485 
84  Martin. Heidegger, Nietzsche, 207 
85 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Portable Nietzsche, 486 
86 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, #125, p.181 
87 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, 208 
88 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Portable Nietzsche, 486 
89 This is not to be confused with the negation of a negation that creates a new positive 
moment of synthesis. 
90 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, 210 
91 There is also an interesting divergence between Nietzsche and Heidegger on the 
prognosis, or possibility of overcoming nihilism. While both thinkers agree on what we 
might call their diagnosis, their respective prognoses vary considerably. This question is 
handled deftly in Daniel Conway’s essay, “Heidegger, Nietzsche, and the Origins of 
Nihilism”. Conway explains that Heidegger’s characterization of nihilism in which 
“Nothing befalls being itself”(12), and Being reveals itself only in concealment, leaves 
human agents with little to no leeway in terms of evoking resistance to this state of 
affairs. We are left, “until Being reveals itself in a new aspect” of its own accord, without 
any “prescriptive or ameliorative measures” to alter this situation. “Nur noch ein Gott 
kann uns retten.” “Only a God can Save us.” (Der Spiegel, 1966) Conway sees a more 
feasible political response to the ills of modernity in Nietzsche, as “by conceiving of 
nihilism in purely naturalistic terms, Nietzsche salvages the philosophical project of 
critique and enables us to envision the possibility of change.”(13) The issue I take with 
Conway’s account of the possibility of critique in Nietzsche through his naturalization of 
the terms of nihilism (as a state of prolonged physiological exhaustion, for example), is 
Conway’s failure to heed the possibility that the epistemological paradigm of 
“naturalism” supposes a humanist perspective that cannot fully engage with the farthest- 
reaching consequences of nihilism. Naturalism questions a certain variation of subject- 
oriented thinking but does not question subject-centered (or humanist) thinking all 
together. 
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92 The introduction of semblance in section 25 is not unrelated to the twisting free of 
metaphysics performed in statement six of the “Fable”. William Melaney, in his essay 
“Heidegger’s Allegory of Reading: On Nietzsche and the Tradition”, follows Heidegger 
in showing that the “emergence of an abyss” in the delivery of statement six is what 
“renews the meaning of metaphysics in Nietzsche’s later work”.(231) The “fable” clears 
the ground, so to speak, for Nietzsche to ground a new metaphysical system founded 
upon this abyss which can only be “that of life”(231) and spurs the discussion of 
perspectivism as a result. Melaney is critical of Heidegger here on the point that “arguing 
in favor of Nietzsche’s renewal of metaphysics, Heidegger seems to place him in the 
paradoxically Kantian position of separating reality from the perspectives that enable us 
to experience the real as the product of human mediation.”(232) Part of what I will be 
attempting to lay out in the following section of my paper is how Nietzsche’s notion of 
semblance arises as the erasure of the possibility of engaging with him on Kantian terms. 
The ambiguity of Nietzsche’s handling of semblance (Schein) will demonstrate that 
Nietzsche is no longer operating under the clean cut distinctions of appearance and reality 
that guide the Kantian framework. “Semblance” is precisely that which neither can be 
called the “real” nor the “apparent”, as it is both and neither. The real and apparent 
distinction applies to beings, and I will attempt to show that semblance can be better 
understood as being, as coming-into-appearance, as phusis. 
93 In his essay, “Twisting Free: Being to an Extent Sensible,” John Sallis makes the case 
that the German word Schein should be translated here as “shining” instead of 
“semblance”. Sallis claims that to translate Schein as “semblance” would be to still 
“enforce in the translation that very subordination of the sensible to which Nietzsche 
would twist free.”(“Twisting Free”, 2) Translating Schein as semblance would still invoke 
a two-world schema for Sallis, as the sensible semblance would still be devalued by some 
reference to the supersensible truth to which “the sensible would be mere semblance.”(2) 
In distinction from Sallis, I keep Schein as “semblance” for most of this section because I 
want to keep in view all of the possible senses of the word and avoid making a premature 
decision on Nietzsche’s philosophy. I also often keep to the translation of Schein as 
“semblance” in order to stress the connection of Nietzsche’s thinking to the pre-Socratics, 
as developed in Heidegger’s 1935 lecture course, Introduction to Metaphysics. (See 
section 5 of this thesis) I would say that the extra-metaphysical character of Nietzsche’s 
use of Schein is not only in it having the possible sense of “shining” or “radiance”, but 
also in its very manifoldness of senses. This ambiguity and fluidity of Schein stands out 
as more extra-metaphysical to me than any of its particular senses. The undecidability of 
how to translate Schein makes it a kind of Derridean pharmakon, eluding both the two- 
world schema of Platonism as well as the one-world schema present in statement five of 
“How the True World Became a Fable.” 
94 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche Vol 1, 211 
95 ibid. 211 
55 
 
 
 
96  ibid. 212 
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99 In “Twisting Free: Being to an Extent Sensible,” Sallis is wary of Nietzsche’s use of 
the perspectival to the extent it is language that remains tethered to the two-world schema 
of the sensible and the intelligible. As Sallis writes, one “needs to consider whether the 
character marked by the word perspectival does not remain, all too decisively, within the 
orbit of the very opposition (of the sensible and the intelligible).”(3) I agree with Sallis 
that the when the sensible is interpreted as perspectival, Nietzsche is in danger of falling 
again “under the yoke of the Platonic opposition.”(3) Though, in distinction from Sallis, 
who does not attempt to directly answer this question of the perspectival in his essay, I 
claim that we can begin to answer this question of the perspectival by removing 
perspective from its connotations of subjectivism. As I show in this paper, Nietzsche 
himself challenges this two-world connotations of the perspectival by saying the 
perceptual character of being itself precedes the substantive character of beings who 
would actively constitute such perpetual perspectives. I see this challenging the two- 
world, and even the one-world, schemas by the indeterminacy and ambiguity of the 
perspectival as it appears from out of itself, as it does not issue from a pre-existent entity. 
In the depths of what Heidegger will call Nietzsche’s name for being, the “perspectival- 
perceptual”, I see no center from which to make the decision of a true and an apparent 
world. Its ambiguity and manifoldness might even preclude one from calling it a “world” 
all together. 
100 Friedrich Nietzsche, Grossoktavausgabe (Leipzig, 1905 ff.); Vol. XIII p.227-228 
101 101 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche Vol 1, 213 
102  ibid. 213 
103  ibid. 213 
104  ibid. 214 
105 In Plato’s account from the Timaeus, chora is “mother and receptacle of this generated 
world” (51a), the formless space or clearing that allows for intelligible forms to take rise. 
The relevance of the chora to Nietzsche’s notion of semblance is how both notions 
attempt to think beyond the limits of what is recognizable and intelligible, yet where 
there is still being, still “something” to be comprehended. 
106 ibid. 215 
107 Semblance here loses all sense of being a semblancing of something, or a 
dissimulating of some truth standing above or behind it. This is now to speak of an 
original priority to what univocally shines or radiates, and which is neither true nor false 
(which amounts to standing behind or appearing in front). 
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111James Magrini in his essay, “Truth, Art and the ‘New Sensuousness’: Understanding 
Heidegger’s metaphysical reading of Nietzsche”, follows a similar discrepancy within 
Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche as I have clearly posed. Magrini, in close attention to 
section 25, shows that Heidegger himself is claiming Nietzsche to hold a novel view of 
truth and one that is not easily reconciled with the correspondence model of truth. 
“Admittedly, Heidegger claims that Nietzsche holds a unique view of truth.. and is 
skeptical of ‘theoretical’ idealism’s claim to possess the absolute certainty of knowledge, 
the undying faith in the correspondence model of truth and the ability of propositions to 
accurately picture reality.”(120) Magrini, similarly to myself, stresses the possible 
inconsistency of Heidegger in still upholding the position that Nietzsche’s view of truth is 
maintained exclusively by knowledge, as the possibility of knowledge is precisely what is 
put into question by the remarks on semblance. Magrini expands upon this possibility of 
a conception of truth in Nietzsche’s work that goes beyond the correspondence model by 
returning to an earlier work of the philosopher. Magrini focuses on Nietzsche’s 1874 
work, “Truth and Lies in a Non-Moral Sense”, to give an alternative theory of truth 
present in Nietzsche, one he describes as possessing an extreme skepticism toward the 
traditional correspondence model of truth. This alternative conception of truth proposed 
by Magrini, that can be found in the 1874 work, centers around how “language constructs 
the laws of truth” and that this aesthetic nature of truth arises through the creative and 
“imaginative use of language” in the construction of metaphors that contain no 
“referential accuracy”(121). This conception of “truth as metaphor”, by cutting out any 
role for the thing-in-itself, is no longer constituted on the basis of a subject (language) - 
object (thing-in-itself) relation, according to Magrini. In my view, this linguistically 
creative account of truth identified by Magrini does not move beyond the correspondence 
model of truth for a few reasons. The first is that Heidegger’s discussion of the 
correspondence theory of truth is grounded in a prevailing essence of truth as homiosis, 
which is not reducible to only the characteristics of truth that Magrini is contesting in the 
correspondence model of truth. While a metaphorical account of truth eliminates the need 
for an explicit relation between subject and object, such a conception of truth still adheres 
to the essential trait of homiosis wherein the correctness of the ‘gaze’ “becomes a 
characteristic of human comportment toward beings.”(Pathmarks 177) As the 
correspondence theory of truth is grounded upon an essencing of being whereby “human 
beings…move into a central place among beings”, the metaphorical conception of truth 
in no way runs counter to this trend toward human or subject-centeredness. Metaphorical 
truth, in fact, plays right into Heidegger’s narrative of Nietzsche as being the 
“unconditioned fulfillment”(181) of Plato’s doctrine of truth. Metaphorical truth’s hyper- 
subjectivism, while on the surface goes beyond correspondence, fulfills the deeper 
meaning of the correspondence theory of truth which is its essential trending toward the 
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113 This is a path I claim to be opened by Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche, yet is a path 
Heidegger himself does not travel. My taking of this path, though in part supported by 
Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche in section 25 of the 1936/37 lecture course, will follow 
this possible resonance of Nietzsche with pre-Socratic thought further than Heidegger 
was willing to venture. 
114 James Crooks, in his essay “Getting over Nihilism: Nietzsche, Heidegger and the 
Appropriation of Tragedy”, performs two invaluable services in furthering the discussion 
of Heidegger and Nietzsche’s readings of the Greeks. Cooks first does an admirable job 
avoiding the temptation to reduce Heidegger and Nietzsche’s pervasive interest with 
Hellenic culture to the influence of nineteenth century German Hellenism. Though it is 
true that Heidegger and Nietzsche’s “compression of Greek culture into a single Western 
Grunderfahrung”(40) was not wholly idiosyncratic in light of 19th century German 
Hellenism, there are better grounds to understand Heidegger and Nietzsche’s Greek focus 
than the explanation of intellectual nostalgia. Secondly, Cooks advances that Heidegger 
and Nietzsche’s “appropriation of tragic knowledge” is warranted by each thinker’s 
respective analysis of the current cultural epoch of nihilism. 
115 Joe Balay, in his essay, “Heidegger on the Semblance of the Beautiful”, attempts to 
show that the Greek view of phusis developed by Heidegger in the 1935 lecture course 
succeeds, where the Platonic conception of eidos failed, in being able to more originarily 
grasp the discordance of semblance (art) and truth that Heidegger problematized in 
section 19 of the 1936-37 lecture course. Balay follows Heidegger very closely and 
concludes that “Nietzsche ultimately fails to uncover what is effaced in the Platonic 
discordance of these relations (of beauty, semblance, and True Being)”(360). He then 
turns to Heidegger’s reading of Greek Dasein in the 1935 lecture course and writes that it 
is “here that Heidegger locates what has been effaced in the discordance between these 
relations (beauty, semblance, truth) in Platonism. For in Heraclitus and Sophocles, being 
appearing, seeming, truth, beauty are neither separated as mere opposites not lumped 
together like some confused amalgam, but ‘precisely by being apart’ the discordance of 
these relations ‘enter into the supreme way of belonging together’.”(363) Balay does not 
recognize, as I do, the importance of section 25 of the 1936-37 lecture course in putting 
into question the purely Platonic limitations of Nietzsche’s project. While we both see the 
1935 lecture course as an important continuance of the discussion of the relation of 
semblance and truth that began in the 1936-37 lecture course (despite the chronology of 
these lecture course), I see Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche in section 25 as a 
transitional moment between these two lecture courses. The ambiguity and prioritization 
of semblance for Nietzsche makes it difficult, in my reading, to assimilate his project to 
the more or less clean dichotomy of art (semblance) and truth maintained in Platonism. I 
approach the 1935 lecture course as complementing and continuing what Heidegger 
began with his questionably non-metaphysical reading of Nietzsche’s novel conception of 
semblance at the end of the 1936-37 course. 
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116 This interpretative attempt to read Nietzsche in concert with the Greeks is not as 
entirely foreign to the project of Heidegger as it may seem, based on what I have cited so 
far from Heidegger on Nietzsche’s place in his history of Being. In the Introduction to 
Metaphysics, Heidegger presents some of his least critical statements on the topic of 
Nietzsche’s philosophy and reads Nietzsche as something of an ally to Heidegger’s cause 
of confronting and questioning the growing wasteland of contemporary nihilism. In 
Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger also gives a rare and favorable acknowledgment 
to Nietzsche’s understanding of Greek Dasein, showing that a Nietzsche-Greek 
connection, even in the framework of a Heideggerian philosophical narrative, is not only 
plausible, but supported. Heidegger writes, “To be sure, Nietzsche fell prey to the 
commonplace and untrue opposition of Parmenides to Heraclitus. This is one of the 
essential reasons why his metaphysics never found its way to the decisive question 
although Nietzsche did reconceive the great age of the inception of Greek Dasein in its 
entirety in a way that is surpassed only by Hölderlin.”(133) 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
HEIDEGGER’S INTRODUCTION TO METAPHYSICS AND NIETZSCHE’S 
RESONANCE WITH GREEEK DASEIN 
 
 
The second half of Heidegger’s 1935 Lecture Course Introduction to Metaphysics 
entitled, “The Restriction of Being”, follows the de-cision, or splitting up, of the basic 
distinctions117 that constitute metaphysical thought from their inceptual “belonging- 
together”118. The second of these distinctions, that of being and seeming, presents a more 
 
nuanced discussion of semblance and its belongingness to being. The challenge of the 
lecture course is to grasp the “concealed unity of Being and seeming,”119 and to follow it 
through to the “inceptive distinction” of its splitting or breaking up as the two rigidify 
into a stable dualism. Heidegger finds a “trace” of the understanding of this inceptive 
distinction in the use of the German word Schein. By his account, there are three senses 
of Schein. First, there is Schein as the “luster and glow” of a candle as it flickers upon the 
night stand. Secondly, there is Schein in the sense of “appearing” or the manifestation of 
something. Thirdly, there is Schein taken as semblance or mere seeming. This third sense 
is meant in the everyday way one might say that “it seemed to be an eagle, but turned out 
to be an osprey.” Of these three senses of Schein common to the German language, the 
second mode of Schein, “appearing in the sense of self-showing”120, serves as the ground 
of possibility for the other senses. In this move toward the inceptive, the essence of 
 
seeming lies in “appearing”, in the “self-setting-forth” of beings as they become present. 
It is at this remarkable point that seeming no longer can be something that stands opposed 
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and distant to ‘true’ being, but it is here that “seeming means exactly the same as 
Being.”121 Yet, it is not only that here seeming is brought into a resonate intimacy with 
Being. The inner connection of being and seeming can only be fully understood if we are 
to understand Being differently. If we are to hear Being as ‘merely’ what is, or what 
exists, and as a word that is too abstract to be worthy of thought, then this belonging 
together of Being and seeming will be lost to our ears. For the resonating of being and 
seeming to take hold in us, Heidegger says Being must be understood in a 
“correspondingly originary way”122 with seeming. Being must open to us, as it did to the 
Greeks, as phusis, the “emerging-abiding sway.” For Heidegger, in order to grasp 
seeming in its ground of possibility as appearing in self-showing, Being must 
correspondingly be taken as phusis. It is only in this transformation of Being within its 
essence, that it can be properly grasped that, “Being essentially unfolds as appearing.”123 
Being and seeming stand as belonging-together only if Being is understood as the 
stepping forth into appearance of phusis. Yet, this is not all. As Being essentially unfolds 
as phusis, this already “implies that Being, appearing, is a letting-step-forth from 
concealment.”124 Insofar as Being is phusis, beings stand in unconcealment. Beings are 
true then, not on account of their relation to some standard, idea or supersenusous 
measure of truth, but because they are, in taking their stand in presence, aletheia (un- 
concealment). With the prevailing of Being as phusis, comes “truth” as the wresting forth 
of beings from their hiding into an abiding presencing, or un-concealment. As Heidegger 
writes, “For the Greek essence of truth is possible only together with the Greek essence 
of Being as phusis.”125 If we are to think semblance toward its ground of possibility, there 
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is not only a corresponding transformation of Being toward phusis, but truth must be 
grasp more originarily as aletheia. All three basic words arise at once, and to say one is to 
say all three. In this intimate belonging a word like doxa can arise. Doxa, often translated 
as opinion, in its inceptive126 breadth of meaning can mean all of the following: glory, the 
respect in which someone stands, the aspect or view that something gives, and the 
opinions we may construct of something. Doxa can resonate as the glory that is, in the 
words of Heraclitus, what the noblest choose “above all others,”127 and it may sound to 
the ear as an opinion in the sense of being an old wives tale (i.e. that hot soup is an 
effective treatment for the common cold). This is not a careless or “bad” ambiguity of the 
language, but, in Heidegger’s judgement, a “play with deep foundations” and a 
“multiplicity that preserves the essential traits of Being in the word.”128 Inceptual thought 
lives in the ambiguous, the multiple, and the unmastered. To think with Greek Dasein is 
 
to dwell at the juncture of the “interlocking triple world”129 of Being (phusis), 
 
unconcealment (aletheia), and seeming (doxa). 
 
In returning to Nietzsche, it is then no objection to his profundity when Heidegger 
writes that “Nietzsche does not become master of the fate entrenched”130 in the word 
semblance (Schein). Having followed how a more originary grasp of Schein has led 
Heidegger, in the 1935 lecture course, toward a joining of semblance with a sense of 
being as phusis and truth as aletheia, I do not see why Nietzsche’s most brilliant, though 
ambiguous, remarks on semblance cannot place him on that same path. In inceptual 
Greek thought, a rich and multifaceted sense of semblance belonged immediately to the 
sense of Being as an emerging forth into appearance (phusis), and to truth that was a 
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stepping out from hiddenness into appearing (aletheia). Nietzsche’s conception of the 
perspectival-perceptual shares with pre-Socratic thought this multifaceted and ambiguous 
sense of an original radiating or shining-forth preceding the familiar division of subject 
and object, true and false. It is in this light, the light of Pre-Socratic thought, that the 
philosophy of Nietzsche can be interpreted as a transitional philosophy, one neither 
containable by the history of metaphysics, nor wholly free of it. As I see it, if we want to 
understand the most original moments of Nietzsche’s philosophy, it is more fruitful to 
place his thinking into dialogue with the Pre-Socratics, than to read his thinking at an 
acute point of oblivion in the modern epoch. It is important to note here that Nietzsche 
himself took his philosophy as closer to the pre-Socratics, and at a significant distance 
from the moderns. In Ecce Homo, he wrote that he was the “first tragic philosopher” and 
that his project was more of an attempt at completing what even “the great Greeks” could 
not do: perform a “transformation of the Dionysian into a philosophical pathos.”131 
In what I have shown so far, it is now more plausible to read within the 
 
philosophy of Nietzsche an implicit understanding of being as phusis. In my reading, by 
defining Being as essentially perspectival-perceptual, Nietzsche takes a bold step beyond 
the metaphysical essence of being as constant presence, and instead evokes its more 
originary character: to radiate forth into a univocal132 play of views, of seeming and doxa. 
Going one step further, I will now develop how there is an unstated, yet developed, 
understanding of truth as aletheia in the seams of his philosophy, making Heidegger’s 
claim that Nietzsche does not question the essence of truth, defined metaphysically as 
‘the true’, increasingly problematic. Carrying out this more ambitious and transitional 
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reading of Nietzsche requires a clarification of two elements of the essence of truth as 
aletheia that will be the focus of my transitional reading. The first of the two elements is 
the sense of struggle, or polemos, in the wresting forth of Being from its hiding in the 
various modes of concealment (seeming, distortion, forgetting, oblivion). The second is 
the threatening, yet complementary, power of concealment as co-essential to the 
revealing of Being as phusis. I show that Nietzsche is properly attuned to these aspects of 
inceptual Greek thought and gives them a key place within his own philosophical 
writings. To show this requires returning to the earlier writings of Nietzsche, The Birth of 
Tragedy and The Untimely Mediations. In the former, I highlight an acute awareness in 
Nietzsche of the primordial struggle that drives and constitutes the soul of Attic thought. 
In The Untimely Meditations, I delve into the concept of the “unhistorical” and how it 
serves as the abyssal ground that both threatens and makes possible what is ‘true’, 
present, and “historical”. 
 
 
 
117 These distinctions (Unterscheidungen), or differentiations, are Being and becoming, 
Being and seeming, Being and thinking, and Being and the ought. The first two of these 
four differentiations are formed “at the very inception of Greek Philosophy”(Introduction 
to Metaphysics, 100). The differentiation of Being and thinking unfolds definitively with 
Plato and Aristotle (p. 100). The differentiation of Being and the ought is, in the words of 
Heidegger, “prefigured only distantly”(p. 100) with the bringing together of the on 
(being, what is) with the agathon (good) in Plato. 
118 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 104 
119  ibid. 104 
120  ibid. 105 
121  ibid. 105 
122  ibid. 106 
123  ibid. 107 
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124  ibid. 107 
125  ibid. 107 
126 As Heidegger stresses later in the fourth chapter of Introduction to Metaphysics, “the 
inception is what is most uncanny and mightiest.”(165) His critique of post-Greek 
philosophy can be all-too-briefly summarized as philosophy’s inability to “hold on to the 
inception”(165), to hold onto this original breaking out at once of Being in its four 
differentiations. Inceptual thought is to hold to this original breaking apart in all its 
uncanniness and force. 
127  ibid. 109 
128  ibid. 110 
129  ibid. 115 
130 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche: Vol. 1, 215 
131 Friedrich Nietzsche, Basic Writings of Nietzsche, 729 
132 Univocal here means that all the views are equally said of Being and no view is 
initially in a privileged relation to, or position within, Being. No one view is essentially 
more in Being than another. This does not rule out any differences between views 
whatsoever, but only eliminates possible essential differences that would divide different 
views at the level of their being. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
CONCEALMENT AND STRUGGLE IN THE BIRTH OF TRAGEDY 
 
 
 
Truth as aletheia cannot be fathomed without an inquiry into concealment, not 
only an inquiring into the forms of dissimulation, but into the revealing powers of 
concealment itself. Also, there is the presence of struggle in the essential intertwining of 
the emerging into presence of truth with its proper untruth taken as (concealment). As 
Heidegger writes in the 1935 lecture course, in the inceptual Greek experience of 
aletheia, “only by undergoing the struggle between Being and seeming did they wrest 
Being forth from beings, did they bring beings into constancy and unconcealment.”133 
And in Heidegger’s 1943 lecture course, Parmenides, he again reiterates this point by 
saying, “un-concealment indicates that truth is wrenched from concealment and is in 
conflict with it. The primordial essence of truth is conflictual.”134 In stressing the hyphen 
that both conjoins and separates the two parts of the word, truth is not to be mistaken for 
something that may stand there, waiting for us to come into knowledge of it. Truth, as un- 
concealment, is a storm that eventuates in the struggle to wrest it from the manifold 
modes of this fundamental phenomenon135 of concealment (seeming, dissimulation, 
forgetting). Similarly, this movement of struggle in the need to wrest unconcealment from 
 
its stubborn hiddenness, was given in the image of the pain undergone by the cave- 
dwellers in Plato’s allegory, as they began their unwilling ascent toward the sun. In the 
character of Oedipus, such a struggle between truth and untruth is brought to a dramatic 
climax. It is a “unique struggle between seeming (concealment and distortion) and 
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unconcealment”136 that drives Oedipus to attempt to unveil the horrors of what remained 
 
in stubborn hiddenness. This passion for unveiling epitomizes the fundamental 
attunement of Greek tragedy. This strife inherent in the manifestation of the truth of 
Being is also captured in Heraclitus: “The mind, to think of the accord that strains against 
itself, needs strength, as does the arm to string the bow.”137 There is no ‘true world’ here 
set apart from the appearances, and there is no talk of harmony without polemos. There is 
first and always the struggle as truth becomes related here, not to knowledge, but to 
courage. As Nietzsche writes, “How much truth does a spirit endure, how much truth 
does it dare?”138 Such is the question we must ask ourselves in order to understand how 
far we ourselves might travel on this path of aletheia, which is necessarily a path of 
 
polemos, of an essential conflict that drives the human toward the decision between being 
and seeming. How far Nietzsche himself is attuned to the strife of un-concealment, is 
addressed in greatest detail in his earliest work, The Birth of Tragedy. 
The Birth of Tragedy is a text structured by a fundamental relationship between 
the Apollonian spirit of form, light and individuation and the dark, dissolutive and self- 
forgetting spirit of the Dionysian.139 The self-forgetfulness of the Dionysian makes it the 
figure of a fundamental tendency in being toward concealment. As concealing, it is not 
only the withdrawal of form as the “subjective vanishes”140, but also the explosive excess 
that empowers the Apollonian form-engendering force as its “mysterious ground.”141 
These “spirits" are not merely, in Nietzsche’s account, representations of nature taken by 
human beings in the function of myth-making. Nietzsche goes further to show that these 
two powers “burst forth from nature herself without mediation by the human artist.”142 
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Nietzsche’s reading of the Greek embattlement to set this twofoldness of being into art is 
not to be mistaken for a modern idealist philosophy that brackets the being of things to 
only our subjective conceptions of them. There is here a virtuoso attempt to think “Greek 
Dasein”143 from out of Greek Dasein itself, to resist the translation of it into the language 
of Schopenhauer’s epistemology and pessimism. 
 
In the first six sections of The Birth of Tragedy, there is a treatment of each of 
these essential Greek tendencies as if they could stand as things separate from one 
another. Yet, from the outset, Nietzsche is setting the scene for a monstrous intertwining, 
and articulating a need each has for the other. The twofoldness of the Apollonian and the 
Dionysian involves “perpetual conflicts with only periodically intervening 
reconciliations.”144 For Nietzsche, the genius of Greek Dasein is how they were able to 
take a stand within the “strife of this antithesis” and perform the “metaphysical 
 
miracle”145 of having both conflictual forces coalesce within the art form of Attic tragedy. 
 
He continues his approach into an understanding of this conflictual bond between the 
presencing and measured light of the Apollonian and the dissolutive and concealing 
excess of the Dionysian, by inquiring into what serves as the ground for this Apollonian, 
form-engendering light. Not just the ground, but even the impetus of the Apollonian spirit 
lies in the intimacy that the Greeks kept with the “terrors and horrors of existence.”146 
Only a people who could experience being itself as something too terrible to exist, who 
could nod their heads in agreement with Silenus, could be a people equally dedicated to 
the enshrinement of being in beauty. The beauty of the Apollonian culture comes to its 
ground by always having to “overthrow some titanic empire and slay monsters” and the 
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Apollonian takes its stand always after having “trumped over a terrible depth.”147 This is, 
 
though, not to take this triumph of form as a defeat over the essential untruth of the 
Dionysian, as the Apollonian “could not live without Dionysius!”148 This beauty of 
individuation and form is less in the Apollonian itself as it grows from the return of 
 
Greek Dasein from its experience of absolute loss in these Dionysian depths. To repeat, 
there is very little evidence in the text that these two spirits can be considered as two 
static powers that then meet at the joining point of Tragic art. There is a much more 
consistent development by Nietzsche of these two spirits serving as significant markers 
within a creative journey of collapse (or death) and return (or rebirth) intrinsic to Greek 
Dasein. As Nietzsche writes, the “light-picture phenomena of the Sophocles hero are the 
necessary productions of a glance into the secret and terrible things of nature.”149 In my 
reading, this return from the proper untruth of Dionysian oblivion does not serve as a 
balance or counter-measure to the Apollonian, as it does not come later or from outside 
the light of Apollo. The Apollonian is instead a form-giving that operates over this abyss, 
and is given its sharpness of limit precisely in this intimate familiarity with the 
simultaneous ungrounding and threatening possibility of Dionysian excess. 
This nihilating excess gives the term, “Greek cheerfulness”150, an intense irony to 
 
the ears of Nietzsche and his readers. It is a monstrous cheerfulness, and an undigestible 
one to our sensitive, modern stomachs. It is a joy, but not one stemming from an 
overcoming of the annihilative possibilities and unrepresentable suffering of the 
Dionysian. Their joy resided in what I will call the constant need, struggle, and resultant 
thrill to wrest order from the perpetual possibility of chaotic dissolution. In my reading, 
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this intrinsic strain at the heart of the coming to appearance of the Apollonian against the 
powers of forgetting and dissolution, is what gives Attic Greece both a unique stance 
within the unconcealment of Being and what makes Nietzsche later reflect that The Birth 
of Tragedy was an “impossible book.”151 It was an impossible book precisely because 
such an essential and intimate strife of the twofoldness of powers is impossible to capture 
within the modern logic of non-contradiction, which cannot resist placing the Apollonian 
and Dionysian as antithetical powers requiring a synthesis. From the metaphysical 
essence of truth as accordance, it is impossible to conceive the Apollonian as having its 
ground, its essence, in the abyssal pain of the Dionysian. The law of non-contradiction, 
and its demand to keep opposites separate in essence, encumbers our attempts to enter 
into the agon of Greek Dasein. Nietzsche is sensitive to these failures of metaphysical 
language and its law of non-contradiction. In hindsight, his first book was not only an 
impossible undertaking, but “badly written, heavy, painful… (and) void of the will to 
logical cleanliness.”152 What if these criticisms point to the very element that made this 
the least metaphysical, the least governed by the ‘true’, of any of Nietzsche’s sustained 
works? The Birth of Tragedy is a work not containable to the province of the 
metaphysical essence of truth just when it is at its least logical, dirtiest, and most 
impossible.153 In it is captured the beginnings of a powerful inceptual grasp of the 
polemos at the origin of the Greek sense of being as phusis, and truth as aletheia. 
 
 
 
 
133 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 111 
134 Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, 26 
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135 It is an important question as to whether one can consider concealment as a 
“phenomenon”, as it is precisely what does not show itself forth. Yet, as Heidegger 
reminds us in Being and Time, phenomena are “initially and for the most part not 
given.”(SUNY 2010, p.34). The phenomenon is not reducible to its presence, but is often 
“submerged”(verschüttet) or concealed to some extent. Concealment is then not opposed 
to the phenomena, but intertwined with, or inextricable from, the movement of self- 
showing. 
136 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, 112 
137 Heraclitus, Fragments, #45 
138 Friedrich Nietzsche, Basic Writings of Nietzsche, 674 
139 As John Sallis writes, in his book Crossings: Nietzsche and the Space of Tragedy, the 
figure of Dionysius is a figure “withdrawn” and “without image”, and cannot be “directly 
manifest.”(42) Yet, as Sallis points out, this abyssal character is not exhaustive of what 
Nietzsche says of the Dionysian. Dionysius is equally an excessive figure, a figure of 
ecstasis, of standing outside of oneself. The figure of Dionysius has this peculiar twofold 
nature of, on the one hand, withdrawal and abyss, and on the other, the self-oblivion of 
ecstatic rapture. In Sallis’ reading, this juxtaposition of abyssal withdrawal and ecstatic 
giving makes the figure of the Dionysian an “excessive figure” and one that “exceeds the 
circuit of metaphysics”(42). This makes the Dionysian a kind of Derridean Pharmakon 
that operates always in supplement to the controlled metaphysical discourse of clean 
oppositions. Dionysius is both “reunion/dismembering, healing/killing.”(51) This 
prompts the question by Sallis (which is of the utmost importance to this section of my 
paper): “What if, instead, it should turn out that from the beginning Nietzsche’s thought is 
engaged in twisting free of Platonism…?”(4) Similarly to Sallis, I read the figure of 
Dionysius as in excess of metaphysics in so far as Nietzsche is, in The Birth of Tragedy, 
moving in a direction wherein that which withdraws and is unimaginable becomes 
question-worthy in unprecedented fashion. While this contradictory figure of the 
Dionysian is an important element of a reading of the text as extra-metaphysical, I 
believe that equal attention needs to be paid to the conflictual element of the Apollonian- 
Dionysian twofoldness. This unrepresentable strife at the heart of greek Tragedy, as it is 
torn open and configured into the impulses of Apollo and Dionysius, is an unresolvable 
tension foreign to the attunements that accompany the harmonious fitting-into-place of 
the eidos and its images that began to take hold with Plato. 
140 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, section 1 
141 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, section 4 
142 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, section 2 
71 
 
 
 
143 This is a term borrowed from Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics. Greek Dasein 
stands, for Heidegger, as a “unique and creative self-assertion amid the turmoil of the 
multiply intertwined counter-play of the powers of Being and seeming.”(111) In less 
Heideggerian language, Greek Dasein is the way in which early Greek thinkers 
experienced the mutual unity and antagonism of Being and seeming non-dualistically and 
as occurring through a constitutive struggle. 
144  ibid. section 1 
145  ibid. section 1 
146  ibid. section 3 
147  ibid. section 3 
148  ibid. section 4 
149  ibid. section 9 
150  ibid. section 9 
151 Friedrich Nietzsche , The Birth of Tragedy, preface, section 2 
152 Friedrich Nietzsche , The Birth of Tragedy, preface, section 3 
153 In his essay, “The Truth of Tragedy,” John Sallis takes this impossibility of the Birth of 
Tragedy, a comment Nietzsche himself made in a later reflection on the nature of that 
book, as a guiding theme. One interesting claim Sallis makes in the decipherment of 
Nietzsche’s self-judgement is that the genesis of tragedy escapes the writing medium of a 
scholarly text, that it is unfathomable to write good and decent scholarly prose that 
captures such a monstrous genesis. “Does the very thing to be said, the birth of tragedy, 
escape the mere voice of the scholar-author, requiring in its place - though concealed 
behind it - the strange voice of a maenadic reveler?”(159) This question of the limits of 
acceptable academic prose to adequately tarry with the cruelty and abysses of extra- 
metaphysical thought is almost an unequivocal “no”. Why is this? I believe it has far 
more to do with the dominant attunements of our bourgeois “professionalism” culture 
than it involves any fundamental incapacity or limitation of our language and 
grammatical forms. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
 
CONCEALMENT AND THE UNTIMELY MEDITATIONS 
 
 
 
I have made the case in a previous section of this paper that, by thinking 
semblance as more basic to the projection of being than the accordance of statements and 
matters as “true”, Nietzsche is able to be placed into an interpretative proximity with the 
Pre-Socratics concerning their shared experience of the emerging, or shining forth, of 
Being as phusis. Yet, more needs to be said before broaching the idea that there may be, 
at the ground of Nietzsche’s philosophy, an experience of truth as something essentially 
other than being merely ‘true’, or accordant. To return briefly to Heidegger’s lecture 
course from 1935, the essence of truth projected as unconcealment is not sufficiently 
grasped by its force of appearance, or what we might better call its ontological movement 
of emerging into presence. As was outlined earlier with respect to the 1930 Heidegger 
essay on truth, this more originary essencing of truth as aletheia is also a proper “non- 
essencing” of untruth. While truth as accordance bears an inessential and extrinsic 
relation to what does not accord, the ‘false’, aletheia cannot be understood by its positive 
moment of ‘truth’, or revealing, alone. As Heidegger writes in the 1935 lecture course, 
“because Being, as phusis, consists in appearing, in the offering of a look and of views, it 
stands essentially, and thus necessarily and constantly, in the possibility of a look that 
precisely covers over and conceals what beings are in truth.”154 In revealing, there is the 
equal possibility that to reveal is also to conceal and that truth is always constituted by 
this constant possibility and danger of being covered over, or of being mistaken for a 
73 
 
seeming. Truth or revealing takes its stand amidst this continual threat of falling into 
concealment. This importance of concealment to the movement of revealing is further 
given a central position in Heidegger’s 1943 lecture course, Parmenides. Here Heidegger 
writes, “perhaps there are modes of concealment that not only preserve and put away and 
so in a certain sense withdraw, but that rather, in a unique way, impart and bestow what is 
essential.”155 Here, concealment cannot be properly understood as a form of negation of 
the positive movement of revealing. The belonging-together of concealment with the 
movement of unconcealment is not reducible to the former as a necessary hindrance to 
the revealing, such in the way one needs the resistance of heavy weights in order to 
become strong. Concealment itself reveals, and the movement of revealing is a 
concealing. An example Heidegger gives to illustrate this point is in the pseudonyms of 
Kierkegaard. With his pseudonyms of “Anti-Climacus”, “Johannes Climacus”, and 
others, “we have a covering that at the same time reveals.”156 In the giving of a false 
name, Kierkegaard is also revealing something important about himself, both in the 
connotations of the chosen false name and in the very choice to use a false name. There is 
almost undoubtedly more being revealed in the use of a pseudonym than in the ordinary 
‘true’ adherence to using one’s name of birth. 
While the belonging-together of concealment and the movement of 
unconcealment is thematized by Nietzsche in The Birth of Tragedy by the intertwining of 
the Dionysian and Apollonian, Dionysian concealment is still consistently subordinated 
to the form-giving power of the Apollonian. In the The Birth of Tragedy, concealment is 
still for unconcealment. Dionysian untruth ultimately serves the truth of artistic form. At 
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this point, it is still to be determined whether Nietzsche can conceive of a truth whose 
essence is untruth. This would be the point where there is an unconcealment for 
concealment. Concealment would then no longer bear the mark of the negative or the 
merely abyssal. Instead, concealment would, as Heidegger writes, “not only preserve and 
put away and so in a certain sense withdraw, but that rather, in a unique way, impart and 
bestow what is essential.”157 Can Nietzsche conceive of such an extra-metaphysical 
nonessencing of untruth? In my reading, a proper prioritizing of untruth or concealment 
as bestowing comes into focus for Nietzsche most clearly in his discussion of the 
unhistorical in the second of the 1874 Untimely Meditations. It is here that Nietzsche best 
articulates a grasp of a fecund concealment at the heart of the shining (Schein) of beings. 
The second moment in early Nietzsche that evokes an extra-metaphysical sense of 
an essence of truth not reducible to accordance, comes from the second of the Untimely 
Meditations, titled “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life”. Here, within the 
question of the value of history and of whether such historical knowledge can serve as a 
path to “untimely experiences,”158 Nietzsche broaches a topic that is of significant import 
in the discussion of his relation to inceptual Greek thought and its extra-metaphysical 
possibilities. It is in this second of the Untimely Meditations that Nietzsche advances the 
concept of the unhistorical. The concept is first used as a description of animals, insofar 
as they are confined solely to the present in such a way that the animal “conceals nothing 
and at every instant appears wholly as what it is.”159 Yet, the unhistorical has a very 
different sense in conjunction with the historical nature and propensity of the human 
being. Humans are constitutionally disturbed by the past, as we are made wretched by the 
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“imperfect tense that can never become a perfect one.”160 The remaining present of our 
 
past (or history),161 closes off all possibility of happiness. Such unlimited presence would 
 
be, somewhat ironically, a “gravedigger of the present”162, as such uninhibited presence 
 
would undermine the very possibility of presence itself. As an example, the condition of 
possibility for the resuscitation of a memory is precisely that all other memories lay in 
latent repose, or more aptly put, stay forgotten. “There is a degree of sleeplessness, of 
rumination, of the historical sense, which is harmful and ultimately fatal.”163 I see here 
the beginning of both a criticism and a displacement of the privileging of presence164 
definitive for the Western philosophical tradition. Later on in the meditation, Nietzsche 
plays with the possibility that the metaphysical privileging of the historical, or present, 
may be only an “occidental prejudice”165. Presence, or the historical, cannot be the sole 
gauge and standard of being. It is an inherently self-undermining force, as its 
 
proliferation is also its impossibility. Presence, thought alone, is an absurdity. Presence 
has an intrinsic need for a limiting and extinguishing of its own light. What Nietzsche 
calls the health of the human being consists in the formation of a horizon166 in the 
interplay of presence and the lethe167 of the unhistorical. The unhistorical, which makes 
 
the human just “one little vortex of life in a dead sea of darkness and oblivion”168, is the 
 
very “womb” of the appearance of individual freedom, or the possibility of historical 
actions and events. This essential lethe constitutive of historical experience is not then to 
be conceived as an equal, but opposed, counterpart to the historical. This is not a relation 
of synthesis. The historical, much like the Apollonian, finds its ground and essence in the 
dark, abyssal sea that it floats upon so precariously. In similar manner, as the present is 
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made possible by the unhistorical, so equally does action find its ground of possibility in 
the near-sightedness of the soul. There can be no true act169 in the grand economy of 
things, for if we knew all the factors and subterranean motivations that brought us to 
action, we would ultimately be reluctant to call any of our actions “honest”, “virtuous”, 
or even “free”. Historical action and events take their grandeur from the "blindness and 
injustice in the soul”170 of one whom acts. In fact, truly historical humans, Nietzsche 
notes, “think and act unhistorically.”171 History, or presence, does not only need the 
 
unhistorical to give it limit and horizon, but is properly subordinated to and “stands in the 
service of”172 this unrepresentable, unhistorical power. In my reading, what Nietzsche is 
advancing in the second untimely meditation is a force of concealment that arises not 
 
only co-essentially with the possibility of history (his stand-in for presence), but is, in a 
sense, “older”173 than this history. This unhistorical power stands, similarly to the sense 
of concealment developed by Heidegger in the 1930 “On the Essence of Truth” essay, as 
what enables an open engagement with beings in its gifting withdrawal. In doing so, 
concealment, for both Heidegger and Nietzsche, takes a “mysterious” precedence over 
the open region that is revealed. 
Heidegger himself, in his 1938-39 Seminar on the second Untimely Meditation, 
reads Nietzsche's concept of the unhistorical as akin to a prevailing of concealment. He 
writes, “The unhistorical (Das Unhistorische) is (in this sense) history (Geschichte).”174 
What Heidegger is denoting with Geschichte is, as Andrew Mitchell puts it, the “event or 
occurrence of the truth of being (concealment).”175 The history of Being is a secluded, 
concealed event as it is the history of Being’s withdrawal and its abandoning of the 
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human. Is it possible that Nietzsche’s account of the unhistorical could lend itself to a re- 
working of the idea of history? History (Geschichte) would be understood in how it 
primarily conceals, or provides non-subjective limitations to the revealing of beings, 
instead of being the linear record of past events. Could Heidegger be reading Nietzsche 
as embarking upon such an extra-metaphysical account of history? This is almost 
certainly not what Heidegger was intending, as the curious remark, one favorable to a 
non-metaphysical reading of Nietzsche, is situated within a text that exemplifies what I 
have called Heidegger’s canonical reading of Nietzsche. Throughout the seminar, 
Nietzsche’s sense of forgetting and history is repeatedly tied to a tradition of 
metaphysical subjectivity. Heidegger says later in the seminar that “Nietzsche had in no 
way overcome subjectivism… but Nietzsche only replaces subjectivism of consciousness 
with that of life.”176 And Mitchell comments that by this subjectivist reading of 
Nietzsche, the conception of truth operative “could not be more traditional.”177 
 
Does Heidegger overlook something in this early work of Nietzsche? What I see 
as being passed over by both Heidegger and Mitchell in their reading of this text is 
Nietzsche’s insistence on the priority of the unhistorical. This power of oblivion is not 
only something that enables presence, but is what we may call “older” than historical 
presence itself. This does not mean that the unhistorical is older chronologically. It’s 
“age” comes from its ontological priority. We could say, with Nietzsche, that presence is 
a peculiar modification or contraction of this older, more fundamental, unhistorical 
power.178 The apparent prioritization of presence itself can be understood by the tendency 
of self-forgetfulness (errancy) essential to the prevailing of the unhistorical. In what I 
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believe to be Heidegger’s subjectivist reading of Nietzsche, he misses the non- 
psychological character of the “unhistorical power.” Heidegger insistently reads the 
unhistorical, as one element of Nietzsche’s grand concept of “life”, as a forgetting that 
functions as the absenting of what is present. The unhistorical, in my reading, goes one 
step further as it is not the psychological process of forgetting.179 It is, more radically, the 
ontological event of the falling into oblivion of what has been forgotten. The human 
psyche itself cannot perform such an event, as that would be to further repress the 
forgotten thing, hence keeping it in some way present and viewable at some later time. 
The unhistorical, in addition to its positive power of gifting180 the historical through 
withdrawal, is also the radical absenting of the absent that erases even the trace of that 
 
which once was, as it erases every relation to the historical (forms of presence). This can 
only occur ontologically, and be an occurrence not in the human and its psychological 
apparatus, but in being itself.181 This non-relational aspect of the unhistorical might even 
be a point where Nietzsche takes the notion of concealment further than Heidegger was 
willing to concede. As Mitchell writes, “Forgetting is not relationlessness, as Nietzsche 
would have it, for Heidegger, but a particular type of relation, a non-relation.”182 
Heidegger holds in the 1938-39 seminar that for him, forgetting, in renouncing any 
relation to the opposition of presence and absence, must be taken as a “non-relation of the 
retaining… and commemorative relation; a particular non-relation, the ‘no longer’ and 
not-yet-again.”183 This leaves a clear sense of phenomenological intentionality within 
Heidegger’s meditative sense of forgetting, as the event of forgetting comes into its own 
only by the holding of oneself in relation to the withdrawal of this quite tenuous relation. 
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In my reading, the non-relationality of the unhistorical severs any and all of our relations 
to the possibility of having an intentional relation with the past. This places Nietzsche on 
an unthinkable path toward not just a sense of essential concealment that mysteriously 
bestows and pervades the givenness of beings, but even further toward a second sense of 
essential concealment as an annihilation of the first concealment (double concealment). 
In my reading, this non-relational aspect of the unhistorical properly deserves the name of 
errancy, or, the “essential counteressence” of truth.184 
In the second essay of the Untimely Meditations, I have shown Nietzsche’s 
philosophy to have a rich sense of concealment in two respects that go beyond The Birth 
of Tragedy. In doing so, I have further strengthened my claim that Nietzsche is a 
philosopher not reducible to the metaphysical essence of truth as accordance. First, in my 
reading, Nietzsche brings concealment to the position of not only being intertwined with 
unconcealment, but takes concealment (the unhistorical) as older and more basic to being. 
Second, Nietzsche finds in this radical concealment a certain non-relationality, or double 
concealment, intrinsic to the unhistorical that further removes Nietzsche’s thinking from a 
metaphysics of presence. There is undoubtedly a sense of concealment present in 
Nietzsche's notion of the “unhistorical” that transgresses the limits of subject-centered 
metaphysical thought and opens out onto the question: What may the truth of this 
withdrawn, non-relational abyss be if it cannot be something that can be held as ‘true’? 
And what essence of truth are we on the way toward, but also already thinking within, 
when we begin to interrogate what does not show itself? 
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154 Intro to Metaphysics, 110 
155Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, 62 
156 ibid. 30 
157 Martin Heidegger, Parmenides, 62 
158 Friedrich Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, 60 
159  ibid. 61 
160  ibid. 61 
161 History should here be taken as the entities or traces of the past in the mode of the 
present or presence, or in the form of present representation. In Nietzsche’s use of history 
in the second untimely meditation, history is not opposed to the present. It is instead a 
term for the remaining present of what is, or was once, present. The human being, for 
Nietzsche, is historical in so far as we cannot let the past become something that truly 
“passes”, or is forgotten. Our historical nature, our immense propensity to keep the past 
presents within the horizon of the current present leads to “the greater and ever greater 
pressure of what is past”(UM 61). History in this context could be called the human’s 
great sickness and perpetual dyspepsia, as the weight of these retained presents “push 
(man) down or bend him sideways” as his or her’s “dark, invisible burden.”(UM 61) 
162  ibid. 62 
163  ibid. 62 
164 In his essay “The Coming of History: Heidegger and Nietzsche Against the Present”, 
Andrew Mitchell argues that in the second Untimely Meditation, Nietzsche’s most 
pertinent critique of presence does not originate from his conception of the unhistorical 
and forgetting. Mitchell instead considers Nietzsche’s most effective attack against the 
hegemony of the presence of the present in his thinking of the political. As Mitchell 
writes, “Nietzsche’s thinking of history would be a struggle against this politically 
enforced presence of the state, of property, of ego”(409). Nietzsche’s counterforce to the 
state would the “community of life” where life is precisely something that exceeds its 
own bounds, that exists in some sense of ec-stasis. I see such a shift of terrain in the 
discussion of Nietzsche’s second Untimely Meditation as a forfeiting of the possibility 
that Nietzsche is anything but a metaphysical thinker of presence. Mitchell’s reading 
lends too much authority to Heidegger’s canonical reading of Nietzsche, and gives 
Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche ultimate say in terms of Nietzsche’s ontology and 
conception of truth. 
165 ibid. 66 
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166 Charles Bambach, in his essay “History and Ontology: A reading of Nietzsche’s 
Second Untimely Meditation”, will also, similarly to myself, understand this notion of 
“horizon” in non-psychological or non-subjective terms. He writes that “what Nietzsche 
seeks to do… is to interpret time from within the horizon of being.” It is important to 
keep in mind that this horizon is not constituted by the active functioning of a faculty, but 
is, I claim, passively formed in a properly non-psychological time-space. It is difficult to 
conceive of this horizon being attributable uniquely to each individual because, if the 
force of the unhistorical was in fact a subjective power or faculty, it would not be a force 
of forgetting but of repression. Forgetting cannot happen but passively, in being itself and 
not in the subject or psyche. (We are here at the inverse of Bergson’s theory of memory 
being preserved in itself.) 
167 In Classical Greek, the word lethe can mean “forgetfulness”, “oblivion”, or 
“concealment” and is related to the Greek word for truth, aletheia (a-lethe). Heidegger 
makes an interesting observation in the 1942-43 Parmenides lecture course that, although 
the crossing out of the a in “aletheia” leads to “lethe”, “nowhere do we actually find this 
word as the name for the false.”(Parmenides, p.20) The word commonly used by the 
Greeks for what we would call “falsity” is pseudos, not lethe. Lethe, though in the 
etymological form of “untruth”, is not reducible to untruth as we commonly use the term 
to mean falsity and lying. Lethe resonates more closely with the sense of concealment 
discussed in Heidegger’s 1930 essay “On the Essence of Truth”, as the concealment of 
beings “older than every openness of this or that being.”(Pathmarks, 148) 
168 ibid. 64 
169 By the truth of an action I do not intend how the action accords with moral standards 
of a given time. Truth is meant here in the sense of the truth of a theatrical drama. The 
truth of, or what is revealed by, a character’s words or actions is often concurrent with the 
character not being fully aware of how these words effect the direction of the play, their 
fate, and the fate of other characters. The character’s truest actions signify that there is a 
larger, unrepresentable confluence of events at work that transcend the explicit actions 
that occupy the present moment of the play. Precisely the hiddenness of this confluence 
to the acting character allows for their actions to unfold as either tragic or comedic. 
170  ibid. 65 
171  ibid. 65 
172  ibid. 67 
173 Martin Heidegger, Pathmarks, 148 
174 Martin Heidegger, 1938-39 Seminar on Nietzsche’s On the Utility and Liability of 
History for Life, 95 
175 Andrew Mitchell, “The Coming of History: Heidegger and Nietzsche against the 
present”, 403 
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178 Nietzsche continues this idea of the priority of the “negative” term of forgetting over 
the “positive” remembering in the second essay from the Genealogy Of Morals. Here he 
writes that “forgetting is no mere vis inertiae as the superficial imagine; it is rather an 
active and in the strictest sense positive faculty of repression…”(GM II, section 1) While 
I see this as an important return to, and possible refinement of, the idea of the 
“unhistorical” from thirteen years prior, it is questionable as to why Nietzsche insists on 
calling this force of erasure both a faculty and “active” in the 1887 text. The verb to 
forget, by the rules of grammar, must have a subject that “performs” the active verb, yet 
in fact I am powerless to make such an event occur (for actively forgetting is to repress 
and is undeniably distinct from forgetting in the broader sense). I do not believe 
Nietzsche to be entirely ignorant of this point of forgetting as occurring beyond our range 
of voluntary action, and hence also beyond the scope of consciousness. 
179 Patrick Wotling, in his essay “Ultimate Skepsis: Nietzsche on Truth as a Regime of 
Interpretation”, also distinguishes between the common psychological understanding of 
forgetting and what Nietzsche is possibly proposing here. Wolting writes, “forgetting 
does not mean that the thing thought, the thing represented in our mind in the moment 
just prior, disappears.”(71) This is to determine forgetting with respect to its being an 
eclipsing of consciousness, to its being no longer present, understanding the occurrence 
of forgetting from the perspective of conscious representation instead of from the source 
of forgetting itself: the unhistorical. Wolting, though, does not pursue what I term this 
trace-less, ontological forgetting. Instead, his focus is on a different kind of psychological 
forgetting wherein “to no longer think about something that one possesses also 
constitutes the specific mark of internalization.”(71) To forget, in Wolting’s reading of 
Nietzsche, is actually to remember the consciously forgotten thing unconsciously, to 
experience the presence of what is thought in action, in the “perfect mastery of what is 
thought”. He makes the connection here to the functional certainty of the drives. 
Forgetting is then the unconscious or unknowing perfection of sure, instinctual action, in 
so far as that action is all the more perfect for not having to be circumvented through the 
cumbersome apparatus of consciousness. This forgetting as the “work of 
internalization” (other than being determined entirely in terms of consciousness and 
subjectivity) runs entirely contrary to Nietzsche’s intentions in the second untimely 
meditation. Nietzsche’s notion of the health that results from the passive forces of the 
unhistorical does not arise as an internalization of what is no longer conscious. Health is 
precisely for Nietzsche when what no longer is, slips into the non-relationality of 
oblivion, and in doing so constitutes or gifts the very horizon of life itself by this vacuum 
of nihilation. To conceive of a sense of forgetting in Nietzsche that involves an 
internalization of the thing forgotten, misses the notion of health put forward by 
Nietzsche in the Untimely Meditations entirely. 
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180 In my reading, the unhistorical is primarily something “positive”, something that 
creates or gifts in its power to erase. When Nietzsche speaks in the second essay of the 
Genealogy of Morals about forgetting, it is associated first with the descriptors of 
“active” and “positive”. (GM II, section 1) (See full quote in footnote 177) 
181 By “being”, I mean that which is denoted by the “it” in “it thinks”. As Nietzsche 
writes, “With regard to the superstitions of logicians, I shall never tire of emphasizing a 
small terse fact, which these superstitious minds hate to concede - namely, that a thought 
comes when ‘it’ wishes, and not when ‘I’ wish… It thinks; but that this ‘it’ is precisely the 
famous old ‘ego’ is, to put it mildly, only a supposition, an assertion, and assuredly not an 
‘immediate certainty.’”(Beyond Good and Evil, #16) What we can call the functions of 
thinking, forgetting, and willing do not stand for Nietzsche as displays of subjective 
control and power. Instead, these “acts” indicate the powerlessness of our power, and 
where one finds the most intimate properties of the “I” steeped in a non-dialogical 
otherness. I believe Nietzsche would agree with Maurice Blanchot when the latter writes, 
“At the same time as we make use of forgetting as a power, the capacity to forget turns us 
over to a forgetting without power.”(The Infinite Conversation, 195) This “forgetting 
without power” is very close to how I am reading an important aspect of Nietzsche’s 
concept of the unhistorical. 
182 Andrew Mitchell, “The Coming of History…”, 401 
183 Heidegger, 1938-39 Seminar, 46 
184 Pathmarks, 150 
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CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
In this paper I presented a unique reading of certain elements of Nietzsche’s 
philosophy, both engaging intensely with Heidegger’s canonical interpretation of 
Nietzsche, and proceeding to advance a less subject-centered and metaphysical 
interpretation of that philosophy. By focusing in particular on his notions of semblance 
(Schein), the Dionysian, and the unhistorical, I developed an interpretation of Nietzsche 
that brings his thinking into closer proximity to pre-Platonic Greek thought as it is 
interpreted by Heidegger, while also thoroughly questioning Heidegger’s canonical 
reading of Nietzsche as a thinker of only truth as accordance. I presented the possibility 
that Nietzsche’s philosophy contains the germinal elements of an inceptual Greek (or 
extra-metaphysical) experience of truth as aletheia. In addition to this, I explored the 
possibility in Nietzsche for a prioritization of concealment that may even surpass the 
experience of truth as aletheia. By showing the resonances of Greek phusis in Nietzsche’s 
mature notion of semblance (Schein), and the rich sense of strife and concealment in his 
early notions of Dionysius and the unhistorical, Nietzsche’s philosophy eludes its 
placement as either the culmination of metaphysics or the most extreme ensnarement 
within metaphysics. By de-emphasizing an interpretation of Nietzsche in terms of his 
place within modern thought (i.e. Descartes and Schopenhauer), I have attempted to open 
the texts of Nietzsche to an extra-metaphysical reading that intensifies the untimeliness of 
his ideas and his guiding pathos. By reading Nietzsche through a Heideggerian lens, I 
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have attempted to bring Nietzschean thought closer to Heidegger while, at the same time, 
preserving the many unresolvable differences and nuances that exist between these two 
significant figures. In conclusion, I have developed in this thesis a somewhat uncanonical 
reading of Nietzsche that both expands the range of his possible interlocutors and keeps 
to the fecund ambiguity of his writings. In doing so, I have kept open the question of 
Nietzsche and his understanding of truth. Instead of closing any doors on Nietzsche’s 
philosophy, my hope is to have opened a new one. May creative scholarship in the area of 
Nietzsche and in the light-footed labor of interpretation never die. 
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